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ABSTRACT
SHIFTY CHARACTERS: IDEOLOGICAL SHIFTING AND
ELECTORAL OUTCOMES IN U.S. SENATE ELECTIONS
by
Clayton Clouse
The University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee, 2013
Under the Supervision of Thomas Holbrook
Very little research has investigated how a two-stage electoral process (a primary
election to nominate the party candidate, and a general election where the parties’
candidates face oﬀ) aﬀects candidate behavior. Here I argue that candidates are at-
tracted to the median voter position of the electorate in which they are running. And
that diﬀerences between the ideological positions of the primary median voter and
the general election median voter means that candidates have incentive to shift their
ideological positions to align with the relevant median voter. I test for the presence of
candidate ideological shifting in U.S. Senate elections. I measure candidate ideologi-
cal shifting by recovering two ideological positions for each candidate (one during the
primary campaign and another during the general election campaign) utilizing dona-
tions from political action committees. Using these measures I find that candidates
do engage in ideological shifting. Candidates align closely with the primary median
voter during the primary campaign, and then shift toward the middle to moderate
their ideological position to align more closely with the general election median voter.
My results also indicate that ideological movement has electoral implications. Can-
didates get punished in the general election for their primary ideological positions.
ii
If candidates were extreme during the primary campaign they received fewer general
election votes than candidates whose primary ideologies were moderate.
iii
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
Most U.S. elections are characterized by a two-stage process. The first-stage is a
primary election where party members nominate a candidate who then carries their
party’s label into the general election. The second-stage is the general election where
the two parties’ nominees face oﬀ. This two-stage process represents all U.S. Federal
elections and many sub-Federal elections, yet little research has spent time analyzing
how this aﬀects candidate ideology or behavior. What sort of behavior should we
expect from candidates who are faced with a two-stage electoral process? Are candi-
date ideologies pushed to extreme positions as a result of primary elections? If so, do
candidates pay a price for this extremeness in the general election? These are a few
of the questions driving this research.
The Downsian model of two-party competition predicts that the candidates will
converge to the median voter’s ideological position (Downs, 1957). Yet in the United
States—clearly a two-party system—scholars have found that candidates do not con-
verge towards the median voter (Aranson and Ordeshook, 1972; Coleman, 1971, 1972).
By and large candidates tend to diverge. Grofman (2004) argued that because many
of the basic assumptions of the Downsian model are violated we should actually expect
divergence.
2At least two of these Downsian assumptions are relevant here and both are highly
related to each other. The first assumption that is clearly violated is that there
is a single-round election for any oﬃce. As I stated previously, U.S. elections are
characterized by a two-stage election process: a partisan primary election followed
by a general election. For a candidate to carry his or her party’s label into the
general election, he or she must first win his or her party’s nomination. To win the
party’s nomination candidates have to compete with other candidates in a primary
campaign. The competition created by other candidates during the primary campaign
will encourage candidates to align their ideology with the ideology of their party’s
median voter. As a result of this primary competition the candidate who wins the
party nomination will be more closely aligned with his or her party’s median voter,
than he or she would in the absence of a primary campaign. The amount of candidate
divergence should be related to the diﬀerence between the parties’ median voters.
Parties that are highly polarized should lead to larger degrees of candidate divergence.
The other relevant Downsian assumption violated is directly related to the first:
elections take place within a single constituency. Voters who participate in one party’s
primary election cannot participate in the other party’s election. There is some
variation within states’ primary voting laws. In some states you must be a registered
party member to vote in the relevant party’s primary election. In other states you
can only vote in one party’s primary election. Even in states with the most lenient
primary voting laws an individual can only nominate one candidate to run for a given
oﬃce. Thus, individuals who vote for a candidate from one party cannot vote for a
candidate from another party for the same oﬃce. This means that the candidates
who ultimately run against each other in the general election, begin the process by
running in completely diﬀerent primary elections made up of completely diﬀerent
electorates.
Once the candidates win their parties’ nominations they face each other in the
3general election. Candidates will find that many, if not most, of the voters that
supported them in the primary election will also vote for them in the general election.
However, this is the case for both candidates. So although a candidate can count on
his or her primary voters as being part of the electorate, the other party’s nominee
will also have many primary voters in the general electorate. It is also the case that
many fewer individuals get out to vote during the primary election than during the
general election. So many of the voters who will eventually vote for the candidates
in the general election were not part of the primary electorates.
There is a clear diﬀerence between primary constituencies and the general elec-
torate. Key (1956) raised concerns that the unrepresentativeness of primary elec-
torates would lead to candidates that were too extreme for the general electorate.1
Key was arguing that primary electorates are more ideologically extreme than the
general electorate, and that this would lead to candidates who are also ideologically
extreme, and ultimately candidate divergence.
Models developed by Aranson and Ordeshook (1972) and Coleman (1971, 1972)
illustrate that a two-stage electoral process characterized by distributions such as
those in figure 1.1 will result in candidate divergence. Aranson and Ordeshook (1972)
get to this result by focusing on candidate behavior. Specifically candidates develop
expectations about their probability of winning the primary and the general based
on a policy position they take. On the other hand Coleman (1971, 1972) looks at
1Researchers who have studied the representativeness of primary electorates have had conflicting
results. Initially, studies found that primary electorates were unrepresentative (Ranney, 1968, 1972).
However, later studies challenged this conclusion (Bartels, 1988; Geer, 1988; Norrander, 1989). Geer
(1988) argued that the comparison groups used by earlier studies were problematic. According to
Geer (1988) past studies have compared primary voters to those who did not vote in the primary
(Ranney and Epstein, 1966; Ranney, 1968, 1972), to party identifiers (Kritzer, 1977), and to voters
in the general election (DiNitto and Smithers, 1972). Geer argued that these comparisons were
potentially misleading because they could have included individuals who did not vote for the party
in the general election. He claims that a better comparison would be primary voters to individuals
who are likely to turnout in the general election and are potential supporters of the party in that
election (Geer, 1988, page 931). From this comparison he found that there was little diﬀerence
between primary voters and the general electorate. More recently Kaufmann, Gimpel and Hoﬀman
(2003) found that open primaries were more representative of the general electorate than closed
primaries.
4voter behavior. In Coleman’s model voters maximize a function that is represented
by a candidate’s ideological distance from the voter, discounted by the probability
that the candidate can win in the general election.
Recently Brady, Han and Pope (2007) conducted an empirical analysis of can-
didate positioning. The authors said candidates face a “strategic dilemma: how can
they please the primary constituency enough to secure the nomination, but still main-
tain electability in the general election?” (page 80). They found that when faced with
such a dilemma candidates choose to position themselves closer to their parties’ pri-
mary electorates. The more ideologically distinct the parties are, the more ideological
divergence between the candidates we should expect.
The force that is predicted to cause candidate convergence in a two-party single-
round election is the fact that the candidate who captures the median voter’s vote
will win the election. However, this force is diminished during the general election in
a two-stage electoral process because candidates must first win a primary election to
receive their parties’ nominations. One could even argue that candidates are actually
pulled away from the general election’s median voter during primary elections. Thus,
if primary elections force candidates to extreme positions, do candidates pay a price
for this in the general election? I try to illustrate the potential for this problem in
figure 1.1.
Figure 1.1 displays the distributions of three electorates: a Republican primary
electorate, a Democratic primary electorate, and a general electorate. To help mo-
tivate this let us assume that general election voters’ positions G are normally dis-
tributed such that G ∼ n(µ,σ2). Next let us assume that the voters in the Republican
primary PR and Democratic primary PD are also normally distributed, but based on
the same scale as the general electorate the distributions would be shifted to the left
and to the right, with µ = σ2 for Republicans, and µ = −σ2 for the Democrats. Thus,
if we found that the parameters for G were estimated to be G ∼ n(0, 1), then we would
5Figure 1.1: Theoretical Distributions
Democratic Primary Electorate Republican Primary Electorate
Dem Median
General Median
Rep Median
know the Republican mean would be 1 and the Democratic mean would be -1. As
far as the variance is concerned, it is not unreasonable to assume that the variance
of the primary electorates would be less than the variance of the general electorate,
specifically that σ2P < σ
2
G. The variance I have chosen for this example is 0.5, which
is one-half of the general electorate’s theoretical variance. Thus, PR ∼ n(1, 0.5) and
PD ∼ n(−1, 0.5).2
The points represent the median voter position of each distribution. If we assume
that a candidate’s optimal position is that of the median voter (Downs, 1957), then
diﬀerences in the positions of the primary’s median voter and the general electorate’s
median voter indicate that the best candidate position in the primary election is
not the best in the general election. This diﬀerence in optimal positions leads to
2To generate the densities in figure 1.1, I used the probability density function of the normal
distribution—often referred to as the Gaussian distribution (Casella and Berger, 2002, page 102).
Specifically I used the function, f(x|µ,σ2) = 1
σ
√
2π
e
−(x−µ)2
(2σ2) for the general electorate’s distribution,
and
f(x|µ,σ2) = .5
σ
√
2π
e
−(x−µ)2
(2σ2) for the primary electorates’ distributions.
6ideological divergence between opposite party candidates. Moreover, greater diﬀer-
ences between the parties’ median voters should induce greater ideological divergence
between the parties’ nominees.
Theoretical Model
The base theoretical model I use is extremely simple: a spatial model of vote. I assume
that there is an underlying ideological dimension that is based on policy preferences.
Taking into account policy preferences, each individual voter and candidate has a po-
sition in this dimensional space. Moreover, following from Black (1958) ideologies are
single-peaked and monotonically decreasing from their most preferred point. Each
individual voter prefers to cast their vote for the candidate who is most ideologically
similar to him/herself. Candidates enlighten voters about their ideological positions
through the use of policy statements, debates, endorsements, and their overall plat-
form. Since candidates desire to win elections, they will try to entice enough voters
to secure an election victory.
Following in the Downsian tradition (Downs, 1957), I summarize the ideological
preferences of a unidimensional electorate with the location of the median voter. A
candidate will receive more votes as the distance between his or her ideology and that
of the median voter decreases. Equation 1.1 displays this idea.
VoteShare = [Candidate Ideology −Median Voter Ideology] (1.1)
As simple as this idea maybe, I make a key assumption that leads to a much
more complicated model. Rather than viewing campaigns as single events (namely
the election day), I follow from Holbrook (1996) and argue that campaigns are best
seen as a process (page 46). Being that the campaign for a given election often begins
7several months, or even a year, before the actual election day, I assume that candi-
dates can adjust their ideological positions as the campaign progresses. To date most
research has assumed that candidates must choose a single position for the entirety
of both the primary and general election campaigns. Specifically, when faced with
both a primary and general electorate candidates will choose to align themselves with
the primary electorate (Brady, Han and Pope, 2007). Since candidates need to win
the primary election before they move on to the general campaign, this argument
makes sense. However, removing the ability of candidates to adjust their ideological
positions removes the inherent dynamic character of campaigns. Moreover, any re-
search that assumes candidates focus on the primary election when placing themselves
ideologically, should expect ideological divergence among opposite party candidates.
Viewing campaigns as a process makes it much more diﬃcult to model candidate
strategy and to recover candidate ideology. Candidates are no longer restricted to
choosing a single ideological position for the entire campaign process. It is not diﬃcult
to imagine that candidates faced with primary and general electorates, such as those
illustrated in figure 1.1, would have a diﬀerent strategy than candidates who only
have a single electorate to please. I argue that candidates should position themselves
close to their parties’ median voters for the primary election, and then adjust their
position so they are closer to the general electorate’s median voter for the general
election. Here I call this candidate ideological shifting.
Candidate Ideological Shifting
Candidates try to prove to the primary electorate that they are the best candidate
to represent their interests. The most successful candidates demonstrate that their
ideology aligns them precisely with the median voter’s ideology. If a particular can-
didate is seeking the nomination of a primary electorate that is liberal, relative to
national politics, then that candidate will have to send signals that speak to her liber-
8alism. It is also true that candidates seeking nominations from conservative primary
electorates will have to present a conservative platform. However, after a candidate
wins the primary election and successfully secures her party’s nomination, she must
then charm a very diﬀerent group of voters—the general electorate. It is this dif-
ference between the primary and general electorates’ ideological distributions that
motivate candidates to shift their ideological platforms after they secure their party’s
nomination.
Key (1956) argued that primary voters are more ideologically extreme than gen-
eral election voters. Initially, empirical studies did find that primary electorates
were not representative of the general electorate (Ranney, 1968, 1972). Later studies
challenged this conclusion (Bartels, 1988; Geer, 1988; Norrander, 1989). But more
recently Kaufmann, Gimpel and Hoﬀman (2003) found that primary voters are more
ideologically extreme than general election voters and that open primaries are more
representative of the general electorate than closed primaries. Whether or not pri-
mary voters are more extreme or more informed than general election voters is not
as important as the fact that candidates are facing two very diﬀerent electorates, and
that this motivates candidates to shift their ideological platforms.
Figure 1.2 illustrates an example of how candidate shifting works. In the figure,
the median voter positions for the Democratic Primary, Republican Primary, and
general electorate are all displayed with dashed vertical lines. The candidates’ initial
positions (primary campaign platforms) are represented with circles, and subsequent
shifts (general campaign platforms) are represented by the tips of the arrows. During
the primary campaign the candidates initially portray themselves as either liberal or
conservative. After successfully winning their respective parties’ nominations both
candidates shift their platforms to appear more moderate and end up converging to-
wards the general electorate’s median voter. Thus, the model predicts that candidates
will diverge during the primary campaigns, and converge during the general election
9campaign.
Figure 1.2: Example of Candidate Shifting
Ideology
Democratic Primary Median General Median Republican Primary Median
CL
Dem Candidate GOP Candidate
The presence of candidate shifting naturally raises questions. Do some candidates
shift more than others, and why? Are some candidates more successful at shifting than
others, and why? However, on a more technical note the assumption that candidates
can adjust their ideology means that I need to estimate two ideology measures for each
candidate: one for the primary campaign and another for the general campaign. To
my knowledge no other research has attempted to recover multiple ideology measures
for a single candidate during a single election cycle. There may be a good reason for
this—as it turns out this is not an easy task.
I use donations from Political Action Committees (PACs) to recover candidate
ideology. Expectations related to which PACs will give to which candidates will be
derived in the next chapter, but in general I assume that all other things being equal,
a PAC would rather give money to a candidate who is ideologically close, than to
a candidate who is further away. The specifics of my methodology are also covered
in chapter 2, but basically it involves recovering PAC positions in the underlying
ideology dimension while simultaneously recovering candidate ideology positions in
the same space. I used bayesian methods, specifically Markov Chain Monte Carlo
(MCMC) simulations, to recover candidate and PAC ideology.
10
I will also need to estimate three measures of each state’s ideology. To develop
spatial models for the primary and general elections I will need separate measures
of a state’s Republican electorate, Democratic electorate, and general electorate. I
will also have to make some assumptions about individual voters. Specifically, I will
have to deal with the idea that some individuals may vote strategically rather than
sincerely.
Primary Voters
Do primary voters vote sincerely or strategically? This is an important question to
consider because the expectations of the model are dependent on the voters’ behavior.
Sincere voters simply vote for their most preferred candidate. Here it is the candidate
whose ideology is closest to their own. However, individuals who vote strategically
take other factors into account and will end up voting for a candidate other than
their most preferred. According to Cherry and Kroll (2003), there are two forms
of strategic voting—negative and positive. Negative strategic voting occurs when
a voter votes for a candidate of the opposite party because the voter believes that
the particular candidate will not do well in the general election. Although there are
many diﬀerent reasons that a voter may believe that a candidate will fare poorly in
the general election, often times they choose a candidate who is ideologically extreme
and does not align well with the general electorate.
Positive strategic voting occurs when voters vote for a diﬀerent candidate from
their own party, other than their most preferred candidate, because they believe that
their most preferred candidate may not win the general election. Often this means
that a voter will nominate a candidate who is more ideologically moderate than the
voter. This idea does have merit. If a voter believes that a particular candidate is
much more likely to win in the general election, then he or she may be willing to
nominate that candidate over another who is ideologically closer to the voter. This
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idea is illustrated in figure 1.3.
Figure 1.3: Strategic Voting
Democratic Primary Republican Primary
DCDM R
Cutpoints
DL
L M C
In figure 1.3 there are three Democratic candidates and one Republican candi-
date. Candidate ‘DL’ is the liberal Democratic candidate, ‘DM’ is the moderate
Democratic candidate, and when compared to most of the Democratic voters ‘DC’
would be a conservative Democrat. The only Republican candidate ‘R’ is a moderate
Republican. Republican candidate R and Democratic candidate DM are positioned
at their respective primaries’ median voter. The three solid vertical lines labeled
“Cutpoints” indicate where the general electorate would be expected to split based
on which Democratic candidate was nominated. For example, the middle cutpoint la-
beled ‘M’ indicates that if the Democratic voters nominated the moderate Democratic
candidate DM, the general electorate’s vote would be split 50/50 between candidates
R and DM.
If voters choose the candidate closest to their most preferred point (i.e. vote
sincerely), Candidate DM would win the Democratic nomination and would go on to
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face Republican candidate R in the general election. Under pure sincere voting the
following integral would allow us to calculate the area under the curve with respect
to the Democratic candidate DM:
pdf(DM) =
￿ DC−0.5σ
DL+0.5σ
1
σ
√
2π
e
− (x−µ)
2
2σ2
Basically we sum the area under the curve of the density function starting at the half
way point between the liberal Democratic candidate DL, and the moderate Demo-
cratic candidate DM (shown by DL+ 0.5σ) and ending at the half way point between
DM and the conservative Democratic candidate DC(DC−0.5σ).3 What we would find
is that candidate DM would win the primary with 38 percent of the votes. Meanwhile,
the liberal and conservative Democratic candidates would both receive 31 percent of
the primary votes. This is illustrated in figure 1.4.
However, if the Democratic voters decided that electability was an important
factor in their candidate choice, then we would have to recalculate the expected
vote share. To motivate this, let us assume that one-half of voters vote strategically
and assign equal weight to ideological proximity and electability. Also assume that
these strategic voters have enough information about the candidates and the general
electorate’s median voter, such that they will only evaluate a candidate as being more
electable if in fact the candidate is closer to the general electorate’s median voter.
For our example this means that the conservative Democrat will gain some of the
moderate Democratic candidate’s voters, that the moderate Democrat will gain some
of the liberal Democratic candidate’s voters, but the liberal Democrat will only lose
voters. Under this scenario the area under the curve with respect to DM would look
more like this:
3To find the proportion of votes that would go to DL you would simply change the intervals to￿DL+0.5σ
−∞ , and for DC to
￿∞
DC−0.5σ
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Figure 1.4: Democratic Primary Example: Pure Sincere Voting
DL
38% 31%31%
DM DC
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pdf(DM ￿) =
￿ DC−0.25σ
DL+0.75σ
1
σ
√
2π
e
− (x−µ)
2
2σ2
Here half of all voters take electability into account, but they give equal weight
to both ideological proximity and electability. Now consider a voter whose ideological
position is DM + 0.45σ. This would place the voter between DM and DC. If the voter
only used ideological proximity to evaluate the candidates (i.e. sincere voting) then
she would choose DM (since the distance between DM and DC is 1, she is slightly
closer to DM). However, if she also evaluates the candidates based on their electability
she would end up voting for DC. In fact, if 50 percent of voters acted this way then the
conservative Democratic candidate DC would win the primary election with about
40 percent of the vote. The DM would get 37 percent of the vote, and the DL would
get 23 percent of the vote. This is illustrated below in figure 1.5.
Figure 1.5: Democratic Primary Example: 50% Strategic Voting
DL
37% 40%23%
DM DC
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Thus, strategic voting can produce candidates who are not the most ideological
representative. Looking back to figure 1.3, the cutpoint labeled ‘C’ shows where the
general electorate would split if the primary electorates nominated candidates DC
and R. In this example Democratic candidate DC would receive approximately 10
percent more general election votes than would candidate DM. Moreover, DC would
clearly win the general election with about 60 percent of the total vote.
Clearly the Democratic voters would be happier with candidate DC representing
them in oﬃce than they would with candidate R. The problem is that DC’s ideologi-
cal position could be considered too conservative by many of the Democratic primary
voters. Candidate DM is positioned directly in the middle of the Democratic elec-
torate, 50 percent are more liberal than her and 50 percent are more conservative
than her; but candidate DC is more conservative than 84 percent of the Democratic
primary voters. Even if we assume that voters choose candidates strategically, this
amount of distance may not be acceptable to many of the more liberal Democratic
voters. In fact, many liberal Democrats may find that the liberal Democratic candi-
date DL is closest to their ideological position and believe that they would already
be sacrificing enough in the way of ideological proximity by nominating the moderate
candidate DM.
However, the presence of strategic voting does not have to spell doom for candi-
date DM. For example, if 25 percent of voters voted strategically then the moderate
Democratic candidate DM would still win the election. This is shown in figure 1.6.
When 25 percent of the voters consider a candidate’s electability, DM wins with 38
percent of the vote, while DL received 27 percent and DC received 35 percent.
There are, in fact, an infinite number of mixes of sincere and strategic voting
arrangements that will lead to a finite number of possible outcomes. As long as
voters can accurately order the candidates (i.e. DL is more liberal than DM, and
DM is more liberal than DC), then either the conservative Democratic candidate
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Figure 1.6: Democratic Primary Example: 25% Strategic Voting
DL
38% 35%27%
DM DC
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will win, or the moderate Democratic candidate will win. Any addition of strategic
voting reduces the liberal Democratic candidate’s vote share. Conversely, any amount
of strategic voting increases the conservative candidate’s vote share. Assuming that
strategic voters assign equal weight to ideological proximity and electability, then in
this example as long as no more than 37 percent of voters vote strategically, then the
most ideologically representative candidate will still win the primary election.
For the purposes of this research I will not assume that individuals vote “sin-
cerely” or “strategically” in the classic sense. I will assume that individuals are free
to vote strategically if they choose. Following from the exposition I laid out in this
section a large percentage of the electorate would have to engage in strategic voting to
change the outcome of the nomination. Even if as many as one-third of the electorate
voted strategically the same candidate would be expected to win the nomination as
would be expected if all the entire electorate voted sincerely.
The notion of wide spread strategic voting assumes a great deal of knowledge
among the electorate in regards to candidates’ chances of winning oﬃce. Researchers
have found that only a small percentage of voters engage in strategic voting (Abramowitz,
McGlennon and Rapoport, 1981; Cherry and Kroll, 2003; Kube and Puppe, 2009).
The electorate’s level of political knowledge is not high enough to support the idea
that strategic voting occurs among large portions of the electorate. This idea is
actually related to Duverger’s Law (Duverger, 1954) where the expectation is that in-
dividuals do not want to waste their votes so they will choose whom they prefer most
from the two top candidates. Cox (1997) does an immensely thorough job of showing
that the conditions under which this type of strategic voting should be expected are
fragile.
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Why Should We Care?
Why should we be concerned about the eﬀects of partisan primary elections on the
outcome of the general election? In general the question of whether or not primaries
lead to extreme candidates speaks directly to the health of our electoral system and
subsequently our democracy. Based on the theory I described in this introduction,
partisan primaries encourage candidates to engage in a strategy that, at the very
least, obscures their ideological position. However, this does not mean that all can-
didates will participate in such shenanigans. As I see it, based on my theory and the
ideological diﬀerence between primary and general election voters, there are a number
of scenarios that all lead to suboptimal outcomes for the electorate.
In one scenario candidates are completely honest about their ideological positions.
In this example candidates who are aligned with their parties’ primary median voters
will win their primary election. But this simply means that general election voters
must then choose from these extreme candidates. However, since many voters in
the general electorate are not as ideologically extreme as primary voters, they may
find that the candidates do not adequately represent their interests. This is precisely
what voters are referring to when they talk about choosing the “lesser of two evils.”
Rather than thinking about their candidate choice as being the best to represent their
interests, they think of their choice as the least bad at representing their interests.
This is definitely not an optimal outcome.
In another scenario, imagine that candidates behave strategically. In this scenario
candidates may position themselves so they gain enough votes to win both the primary
and general elections. Somewhere between the median voter of the primary electorate,
and the median voter of the general electorate would be the most obvious choice.
However, in this scenario the true ideological position of the candidate is unclear. If
such a candidate was elected, his or her policy choices may surprise voters. Another
problem that arises is that the candidate risks losing the primary nomination to a
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candidate who is closer to the party’s median voter.
However, keep in mind that my theory allows candidates to shift their ideology
after the primary election and align it more closely with the general median voter’s
ideology. In yet another scenario candidates may actually shift their ideology to
align with the relevant median voter. A candidate could appear ideologically extreme
to win the primary nomination, and then shift his or her ideology to appear more
moderate in hopes of winning the general election. In this case, as with the last, the
ideological position of the candidate would be unclear.
All three of these scenarios describe a shabby democratic process. In the first,
a multitude of voters are forced to choose between two candidates who are simply
too extreme. In the second scenario candidates choose an ideological position that
will give them the best chance of winning both the primary and general elections.
Moreover, candidates may or may not be revealing their true ideology. And in the
last scenario candidates actually shift their ideological location after the primary
election is finished. In this last scenario it is clear that candidates are not revealing
their true ideology, and are simply deceiving the electorate in order to gain votes.
That being said, the electoral process is not the only thing aﬀected by primaries
and extreme candidates. Legislative politics and policy choices can also be aﬀected.
Today the U.S. Congress is more ideologically polarized than it has been in 50 years.
Figure 1.7 illustrates how polarized Congress has become. The figure begins at the
top with the 91st Congress and stops at the 111th. The Ds represent the distributions
of Democratic legislators and the Rs represent the distributions of Republican legis-
lators.4 There was a lot of ideological overlap between Democratic and Republican
legislators in the The 91st Congress. The 91st Congress began on January 3rd 1969.
The Democratic Party had a 14 seat majority in the Senate and a 51 seat majority in
the House. In fact, it was not until the 97th Congress, which started in 1981, that the
4The plots were constructed by the author using DW-Nominate scores (Poole and Rosenthal,
2007).
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Republicans held a majority in either chamber—in this case it was the Senate. The
Republicans did not hold a majority in the House until the 104th Congress in 1995.
As you can see from figure 1.7, the distribution of Democratic and Republican
legislators has gradually polarized. The Democrats have become more liberal and the
Republicans have become more conservative. By the 104th Congress there is virtually
no ideological overlap between Democrats and Republicans. Moreover, the polariza-
tion has increased over the following seven Congresses. Aldrich and Rohde (2000)
argue that ideological homogeneity within the parties, and ideological divergence be-
tween the parties, leads to Conditional Party Government.
There are several things that occur as a result of Congressional polarization.
First, the majority party members will choose policy positions that they find pleasing.
An ideologically extreme majority party leads to ideologically extreme policy choices
that may only satisfy a small portion of the public.
Moreover, since members of both parties are ideologically extreme, polarization
also means the policies that one party finds favorable will be all the more distasteful
to the other party. If the majority party attempts to pass legislation that the minority
party does not like, disputes will arise. This fighting could lead to legislative gridlock.
Depending on the margin of the seats held by the majority party, the minority party
could block legislation at various junctures in the policy process.
Congressional polarization could also lead to large swings in policy as one party
secures or loses majority status. If members of the minority party spent the past few
years watching the majority party pass ideologically extreme policies, the first thing
they may want to do when they gain a majority is overturn many of the policies
enacted by the previous majority.
On the other hand, there are some positive eﬀects from Congressional polariza-
tion. The American Political Science Association raised some concerns regarding the
status of the American Political Parties more than 5 decades ago (APSA, 1950). One
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Figure 1.7: Congressional Polarization: House of Representatives
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of these concerns included clearer choices for the voters. Extreme policy positions do
provide a clear diﬀerence between the parties.
Outline
For a couple of reasons I chose to test this theory on Senate elections. House elections
are rarely competitive. House incumbents enjoy a reelection rate of approximately
90-95 percent. There are various reasons for this lack of competition (heterogeneous
districts because of redistricting, information asymmetry), but for my purposes the
lack of competition means that candidates will not be attracted to the median voter
in either the primary or general election. Thus, the House would not provide the
optimal test of my theory.
On a technical note, I would not able to generate district level ideology measures
for the primary electorates in the House. This is because the surveys I use to estimate
electorate ideology (and most national surveys) do not have enough observations at
the House district level. Therefore, even if I looked past the lack of competition within
House elections, I would not be able to provide an empirical test of my theory.
Although Presidential elections may seem like a good choice, because they are
competitive and I would have no trouble estimating primary electorate ideology mea-
sures, there are simply too few cases to generate reliable parameters from statistical
models.
Senate elections, on the other hand, are much more competitive than House elec-
tions. This competition should encourage candidates to align their ideology with that
of the median voter. Since Senate elections are state-wide, I should have little trouble
estimating the ideology of the primary electorates. Moreover, there are approximately
33 Senate elections every two years, so there should be enough cases to obtain reliable
parameter estimates.
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This dissertation proceeds in Chapter 2 with the development of candidate ideol-
ogy measures. I model donation decisions from Political Action Committees (PACs)
to recover two separate ideology measures for each candidate—one during the primary
campaign and other during the general election campaign. The models are estimated
using Markov Chain Monte Carlo simulations.
In Chapter 3, I estimate state ideologies. This includes separate ideology mea-
sures of each state’s general electorate, Democratic primary electorate, and Republi-
can primary electorate. The state ideology measures were estimated using multilevel
modeling approaches. In Chapter 3, I also analyze candidate ideology positioning in
reference to the state ideologies. I pay special attention to the diﬀerence between
candidates’ primary ideologies and their general ideologies.
In the fourth Chapter, I investigate this idea of candidate ideological shifting. I
begin by analyzing the various factors that could aﬀect candidate shifting and develop
relevant hypotheses around these factors. Using a model of candidate ideological
shifting to test the hypotheses, I find evidence that candidates do in fact shift towards
the center following a primary election victory.
In Chapter 5, I use the candidate and state ideology measures recovered in the
second and third chapters to develop spatial models to predict candidate vote share.
Spatial models are estimated for both primary elections and general elections. I find
that, during both the primary and general election campaigns, candidates must take
into account the ideology of the median voter. I also find some weak evidence that
candidates are held accountable in the general election for the ideological position
they take during the primary campaign. Finally, in Chapter 6, I summarize some of
my most important findings, discuss the possible implications, and recommend some
possible directions for future research.
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Chapter 2
Candidate Ideology
The political arena is a vast labyrinth of issues and interests that lead to many diﬀerent
policy choices. If you add to this the notion that all politics are local, then synthesizing
all of these issues and interests into a simple dimensional space to position any one
individual relative to everyone else may seem to be an exercise in futility. However,
this has not stopped researchers from trying. Today the word “ideology” has come to
be known as the name of this simple dimensional space. Although the actual space
that ideology represents is extremely complex, a single left/right dimension describes
this complexity with enormous accuracy. For the purposes of this research, I will
assume that individual policy preferences can be represented as ideology. The goal
for this chapter then becomes estimating Senate candidate ideology.
The diﬃcultly associated with recovering measures of candidate ideology has
led many researchers to rely on measures based on roll call votes (Burden, Caldeira
and Groseclose, 2000, pg 238). Variants of roll call based ideology measures include
NOMINATE (Poole and Rosenthal, 1985, 1991, 2007), Heckman-Snyder (Heckman
and Snyder, 1997; Snyder and Groseclose, 2000), ADA scores (Groseclose, Levitt and
Snyder, 1999; Levitt, 1996), and ACU scores. These measures use legislators’ roll call
voting records, or a subset of the legislators’ roll call votes, to sort out legislators’
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positions in a dimensional space.
Some of the research that has focused on describing this dimensional space has
questioned the number of dimensions the space should contain. Poole and Rosenthal
(2007) used roll call votes from 1789 to 2004 to recover legislators’ ideological posi-
tions. They found that 84.5 percent of all roll call votes for the House and 82.3 percent
of all roll call votes for the Senate were classified correctly using a single dimension.
When they added a second dimension the percent correctly classified increased 2 per-
cent in the House (from 84.5 to 86.5 percent), and 2.9 percent for the Senate (82.3
to 85.2 percent). They found that adding dimensions beyond the second provides no
additional benefit to the model’s fit. They claim that, “the first-dimension almost
always divides the two major political parties while the second dimension picks up
divisions within the parties” (Poole and Rosenthal, 2007, page 42). This second di-
mension of ideology was usually characterized by regional diﬀerences on issues of race
(e.g. slavery, civil rights).
However, Jackson and Kingdon (1992) argued that there are fundamental prob-
lems inherent in measures of ideology based on roll call votes. Primarily they claimed
that it is very diﬃcult to parse out a legislator’s true ideology from the influences
of party leadership, constituencies, and interest groups. Moreover, they argue that
using roll call based measures of ideology to predict legislator votes is inappropriate.
Instead, an exogenous measure of ideology—independent of voting record—would
be much more desireable. Hill, Hanna and Shafqat (1997) attempted to obtain ex-
ogenous measures through the use of newspaper stories; but, Burden, Caldeira and
Groseclose (2000) analyzed 9 diﬀerent measures of Senator ideology, including those
of Hill, Hanna and Shafqat (1997), and found that measures of ideology that use roll
call votes are at least as good as any other measures.
Although roll call based measures of legislator ideology have proven to be ex-
tremely useful, there are several reasons that I would not be able to use them for this
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study. The most important reason is because of my assumption that candidates can
adjust their ideology as the campaign progresses. Using a roll call based measure of
ideology would not allow me to estimate separate ideology measures for the primary
and general campaigns. This would not allow measurement of any ideological shifting
or adjustment between the primary and general campaigns.
Aside from not being able to obtain two separate ideology measures for each
candidate, using roll call votes to estimate ideology would not allow me to recover
the ideology of candidates who had not served in oﬃce. This would eliminate many
challengers, and in some cases entire openseat elections. For these reasons I needed to
find a diﬀerent way to recover candidate ideology. I chose to use campaign donations
from PACs to candidates as a way to recover the ideological dimensional space.
PAC Donations
It is clear that PACs are interested in aﬀecting political campaigns. In 2008, PAC
independent expenditures against candidates for federal oﬃce where more than $300
million, independent expenditures for candidates totaled more than $194 million, and
contributions directly to candidates were nearly $472 million. All told, PACs spent
$1 billion on federal elections in 2008.1
Ultimately, PACs are interested in the political process because they are con-
cerned with aﬀecting policy outcomes. However, previous research has tried to reveal
why a PAC chooses one candidate over another. PACs tend to favor incumbents over
challengers (Endersby and Munger, 1992; Grier and Munger, 1993). Congressional
incumbents are reelected at large rates. In the House, approximately 95 percent of
incumbents seeking reelection are successful. Senate incumbents are not as successful,
but their reelection rates are still usually in the mid to upper 70 percent range. If
PACs are serious about aﬀecting policy outcomes, they need to work with candidates
1These data came from the Federal Elections Commission: http://www.fec.gov/
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who are likely to win elections. Thus, it is understandable that they would favor
incumbents over challengers.
Others have found that PACs focus campaign contributions on legislators who
hold seats on committees with relevant jurisdiction (Cox and Magar, 1999; Grier and
Munger, 1993, 1991; Munger, 1989). If PACs want to aﬀect policy in specific areas
of interest, it would make sense to support members of Congress who hold seats on
committees that are charged with formulating policy in those specific areas of interest.
Research also suggests that majority party membership can translate into more PAC
donations (Cox and Magar, 1999). Since the majority party sets the Congressional
agenda, PACs will be more successful in getting policy changes with the majority
party. Grier and Munger (1993) found that committee membership was important in
the House, but party was more important than committee membership in the Senate.
This makes sense when you think about some of the diﬀerences between the House
and the Senate. The additional 335 members make floor debate in the House much
more cumbersome than in the Senate. Senators have more freedom to debate the
tenets of a given bill than members of the House. Thus, it would make sense for
a PAC to focus more heavily on committee membership in the House than in the
Senate.
Research has also assumed that competitive elections attract more PAC contri-
butions than non-competitive elections (Grier and Munger, 1986; Poole, Romer and
Rosenthal, 1987). Poole, Romer and Rosenthal (1987) argued that each dollar spent
is more productive in a close race than in a non-competitive race. The idea here is
that there is little reason to focus on an election that is a sure thing. Instead, PACs
should spend their money on close races where they have a chance to influence the
outcome. However, some authors have argued that campaign donations are really
about buying access to legislators (Hall and Wayman, 1990; Langbein, 1986; Poole
and Romer, 1985). If this is true, then campaign donations do not necessarily need to
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be aimed at aﬀecting the outcome of an election. Instead, aﬀecting policy outcomes
would be the primary goal of a PAC’s donation. To the extent that donations aﬀect
the amount of influence PACs have on legislators, PACs will be inclined to give money
even in non-competitive elections.
Here I argue that, whether the reasons are related to committee jurisdiction,
competition, or access, all other things being equal, a PAC would rather contribute to
a candidate with an ideology that most closely fits with its own (Grier and Munger,
1986; Poole and Romer, 1985; Poole, Romer and Rosenthal, 1987). According to
McCarty and Poole (1998) (pages 2-3), this type of spatial model of PAC contributions
has been widely accepted by campaign finance scholars.
Very little research has attempted to use PAC donations to recover candidate
ideology. To my knowledge, Poole and Romer (1985) was the earliest attempt to use
PAC donations to estimate candidate ideology. A bit more work was done in McCarty
and Poole (1998). And most recently, Bonica (2010) presented a paper at the 2010
Midwest Political Science Association’s Annual Meeting. There are a few diﬀerences
that separate the way I use PAC donations from how these previous studies used PAC
donations.
Poole and Romer (1985) and McCarty and Poole (1998) organized their data by
House district. In Poole and Romer (1985), a PAC was thought to support a candi-
date if it gave money to the candidate, and oppose the candidate if it gave money to
the opponent. This may not seem like a problem since PACs normally decide to favor
one candidate over the other in a particular race. However, there are many occasions
when PACs do donate to opposing candidates. In the Senate races from 2000 through
2008, approximately 33 percent of PACs gave to opposing candidates in primary elec-
tions, and approximately 25 percent gave to opposing candidates in general elections.
The problem I see is related to how PACs will be classified. For example, say there are
two PACs (PAC-A and PAC-B) and two candidates (Candidate-A and Candidate-B)
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running against each other. PAC-A donates $1000 to both candidates in a particular
district’s election. PAC-B, on the other hand, gives no money to either of the can-
didates. Since PAC-A gave $1000 to both candidates, the donation to Candidate-A
would be cancelled out by the donation to Candidate-B. So, in reference to the par-
ticular election, PAC-A and PAC-B would be classified identically. However, PAC-A
is clearly much more interested than PAC-B in this particular election.
McCarty and Poole (1998) tried to solve this by arguing that, if the PAC gave
more money to one of the candidates, then that would be the candidate that the
PAC supported. However this is not the best solution. This can be seen if we
return to the same situation as the preceding paragraph, but change the donations
around a bit. Say that PAC-A gives $1000 to Candidate-A and $900 to Candidate-B.
PAC-A would be classified as supporting Candidate-A. Now say that PAC-B gives
$1000 to Candidate-A and nothing to Candidate-B. Both PACs would be classified
as supporting Candidate-A, and as not supporting Candidate-B. In this case both
PACs may have the same feelings about Candidate-A, but clearly their feelings about
Candidate-B are not the same. However, both would be classified as not supporting
Candidate-B when PAC-A clearly has a more positive view than PAC-B of Candidate-
B.
Bonica (2010) has improved on these earlier studies by compressing the donation
amounts into count data and using methods from item response theory. Moreover,
he used compressed “contribution amounts for contributor-candidate pairs as the
unit of observation” (Bonica, 2010, page 6). This allowed candidates in the same
election to be separated from one another. However, I cannot use this method in my
research because of the restrictions that are placed on the PACs and candidates. For
a candidate to be included in the analysis, he or she must receive donations from
30 or more unique PACs. For a PAC to be included, it must donate money to 30
or more unique candidates (Bonica, 2010, page 12). This 30 or more threshold is
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probably acceptable for House elections; however, since I look at Senate elections,
where approximately 33 seats are up for election during each cycle, dropping PACs
that give to fewer than 30 candidates would remove most of the PACs. As the deletion
process ensued, I would find that the number of candidates who received 30 or more
donations from PACs that gave to 30 or more candidates, would quickly approach
0. Ultimately, the number of observations would be much too small for any reliable
estimation. Furthermore, there are also some serious statistical problems that have
yet to be addressed; specifically, reconciling the maximum likelihood estimation with
the “incidental parameter problem.”
Although a thorough discussion of the incidental parameter problem is vastly
beyond the scope of this dissertation, a few words may be useful. To my knowledge,
the problem was first revealed by Neyman and Scott (1948).2 In short, the incidental
parameters problem is that maximum likelihood estimators may not be consistent as
the number of incidental parameters in a model increases (where “incidental param-
eters” are parameters that are not directly connected to any information). Models
that estimate latent dimensions must face the incidental parameters problem. In the
models described here, the candidate ideology estimates themselves are incidental
parameters. Jackman (2009) gives a simple equation to estimate the number of inci-
dental parameters: p = nd+m(d+1). Where p is the number of incidental parameters,
and for our purposes n is the number of candidates, m is the number of PACs, and d is
the number of dimensions. Bonica (2010) scales 3572 PACs and 3314 candidates from
1980-2008. This comes to 10,458 incidental parameters in a one-dimensional model.
However, including fixed eﬀects and scaling variance terms for individual PACs and
candidates, and over-dispersion parameters for candidates, the model actually has
many dimensions. In this case, the number of incidental parameters would be in the
2A survey of the incidental parameters problem and recent developments with it can be found in
Lancaster (2000). Many statisticians are highly concerned with this problem and very recent articles
are still trying to find solutions (e.g. see Moreira, 2009). However, in the social sciences, concern
for this problem is much less frequent.
31
30,000 range. Aside from the inconsistency that arises from such a large number of
incidental parameters, Jackman (2009) argued that “computing standard errors for
maximum likelihood estimates is often impractical, since the information matrix is
too large for direct inversion” (page 438).
PAC Decision Criteria
Assuming that PACs have a limited amount of money available for campaign do-
nations, there are essentially two things they must consider when making donation
decisions. First is the likelihood that the particular candidate will go on to win the
election. Second is the likelihood that, once in oﬃce, the candidate will work to adopt
policy positions that are favorable to the PAC. To date, research has focused more on
the first criterion—the likelihood that the candidate will win the election. Much less
work has been done on the second criterion—will the candidate adopt favorable policy
positions. I argue that this second criterion can be estimated based on a candidate’s
ideological distance from a PAC.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the logic behind using ideological distance as a criterion
for PAC donation decisions. For the purposes of simplicity assume there are two
candidates (candidate A and candidate B) running for the same oﬃce, that the PAC
only has enough money to support one of the candidates, and that each candidate
has an equal chance of winning the election. Since the last assumption (which is the
first criterion for a PAC’s donation decision) does not help the PAC decide which
candidate’s campaign it should give money to, the PAC must decide which candidate
is more likely to adopt policy stances that it finds favorable. To make this decision, the
PAC would look at the policy positions that the candidates support, they may even
have had direct contact with the candidates, and estimate the candidates’ ideology
distance from their own. In this case they would find that Candidate B’s distance
from their own is x, and that Candidate A’s distance is twice that, or 2x. The PAC
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should come to the conclusion that Candidate B is more likely to adopt a policy
position that it would find favorable.
Figure 2.1: Second Criterion - Ideological Distance
Candidate A PAC Candidate B
Distance=2x Distance=x
However, if we adjust some of our assumptions, then the PAC may not arrive
at the conclusion that Candidate B is the best choice. For example, if Candidate A
was much more likely to win the election, the PAC may decide that giving money to
Candidate B would be a waste and that their money would be better spent trying to
curry favor with the likely winner. It could also be the case that the PAC has enough
money to provide campaign donations to both candidates. In that case, if Candidate
A was still the likely winner, the PAC could give money to both candidates, just in
case Candidate B did win the election.
Before I specify a statistical model to recover candidate ideology, I wanted to
reiterate the theoretical framework that the statistical model will be built upon.
First, candidates choose an ideological position for the primary campaign. Then,
candidates can adjust their ideological position after the primary election. PACs have
a limited amount of money they can spend on campaign donations. Thus, they use
two considerations to decide which candidates they will support. First, they favor
candidates who have a good chance of getting elected. Second, PACs also choose
candidates who are likely to support policy positions the PACs find favorable, once
the candidates are in oﬃce.
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There is at least one caveat that needs to be discussed. If the ultimate goal of a
PAC donation is to aﬀect policy outcomes, then there is a possibility that PACs will
not give money to candidates who have ideologies that are precisely the same as their
own. The idea being that a PAC will not need to influence a candidate whose ideology
is the same as its own, because the candidate will vote for the PAC’s preferred policy
outcome, whether or not the PAC gave the candidate money. On the other hand,
candidates who have ideologies that are close, but not exactly the same as the PAC,
may be the best targets for a PAC’s donations. In this case, a PAC’s donation could
influence the candidate enough to vote in line with the PAC’s position.
Figure 2.4 illustrates the theoretical relationship between ideological distance and
the probability of a donation. The bottom panel illustrates two of the possible shapes
that we would expect if PACs do not give money to candidates whose ideologies are
exactly the same as their own. The top panel shows two of the possible shapes that
we would expect if PACs do give money to candidates whose ideologies are most
similar with their own. You should notice that although the PACs’ shapes change
dramatically between the top and bottom panels, the basic attributes of PACs A and
B—relatively to each other— do not change from top panel to the bottom panel. In
both the top and bottom panels PAC-A is much more interested in giving money to
candidates who have similar ideologies to its own than is PAC-B. Moreover, in both
panels PAC-A’s probability of giving to candidates whose ideologies are further from
its own is much smaller than is PAC-B’s probability. There are a number of ways
that these results could be derived. It could be the case that PAC-B is much more
confident in its ability to influence candidates. It could also be that PAC-A’s interests
are much more narrow than those of PAC-B.
The potential problem that this raises is if PACs do not give money to candidates
who are ideologically similar to themselves, then I cannot rely on PAC donations to
recover candidate ideology. However, as I discuss in the next section (“Estimating
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Figure 2.2: Caveat to Ideological Distance
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Candidate Ideology”), I do not rely solely on the distance between PACs and candi-
dates to predict PAC donations. I also include variables that measure characteristics
other research has found to be important to PAC donation decisions. Be that as it
may, I will still need to keep this caveat in mind as I proceed with this study. More-
over, I will proceed under the assumption that all other things being equal, PACs are
more likely to give money to candidates who share their ideological dispositions than
to candidates who do not.
Estimating Candidate Ideology
In most cases, PACs favor one candidate over the other in a particular race. How-
ever, I mentioned previously that there are many occasions when PACs do donate to
opposing candidates. In the Senate races from 2000 through 2008, approximately 33
percent of PACs gave to opposing candidates in primary elections, and approximately
25 percent gave to opposing candidates in general elections. Either way, a PAC must
ultimately decide whether or not they will donate money to a particular candidate.
Here a PAC’s decision to donate to a particular candidate is boiled down to a di-
chotomous indicator—either the PAC gave money to the candidate or it did not. The
result is a candidate by PAC matrix of donation decisions. The cell is given a zero if
the PAC did not donate to the candidate, and a one if it did donate to the candidate.
I assume that PACs’ donation decisions over all candidates are characterized by a
Bernoulli distribution, such that the expected value of their choice (Y) is p.
Y =
￿
1 with probability p
0 with probability 1− p, where 0 ≤ p ≤ 1
Thus,
Expected[Y ] = 1p + 0(1− p) = p
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Equation 2.1 displayed below is the probability that PACj will donate money
to candidatei, and illustrates the statistical model I used to estimate PAC donation
decisions and recover Senate candidate ideology. Other model specifications were also
used, for example: Probij = αj − βj [(Ij − Ii )2]. This introduced a parameter to weight
the spatial term (β), and a constant (α). However, it made very little diﬀerence to the
final ideology estimates. The probability that PACj will donate money to candidatei
is based on an i by n matrix (X) of candidate and election specific characteristics
that PACs use to estimate the likelihood that a candidate will win the election.
Pij = Xiβn − [(Ij − Ii )2] (2.1)
The characteristics included in the matrix (X) that PACs use are based on the
first PAC decision criterion: the likelihood that the candidate will win oﬃce. These
include whether or not the Senate seat was open. A given challenger is much more
likely to win an openseat contest than to beat an incumbent. Incumbents have many
advantages over challengers, thus all other things being equal a PAC would prefer
to support an incumbent rather than a challenger. PACs may also prefer candidates
who identify with the majority party, and candidates who chair committees. I also
include a measure for the competitiveness of the election.
The probability that PACj will donate money to candidatei is also based on the
second PAC decision criterion: the likelihood that the candidate will adopt policy
positions that are favorable to the PAC. To capture this likelihood, I use the distance
between the ideologies of PACj and candidatei in a single dimension policy space.
This is represented by the term: [(Ij − Ii )2].
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Candidate Ideology Shape
The form of a candidate’s ideology should not be thought of as a single point. Once
a candidate is in oﬃce she has the freedom to vote any way she would like on a
particular piece of legislation. In terms of the ideology dimension we have been
discussing, she can take a position that would be characterized as liberal on one vote,
and a conservative position on the next. Even if the two votes are for the exact
same or a similar piece of legislation, legislators are technically free to vote any way
they choose. Therefore, a legislator’s ideology is best described as a density where
the probability that she will vote yea for a particular piece of legislation is related
to the thickness of her density at the position of the legislation. In the same light,
a candidate’s ideology is also better characterized as a density where a candidate’s
probably of taking a specific ideological position is directly related to the density of
her ideological distribution. This idea is illustrated in figure 2.3.
The densities in the top panel of figure 2.3 represent the ideologies of two diﬀerent
legislators. Following from Black (1958) the legislators’ ideologies are single-peaked
and monotonically decreasing from their ideal points. I assume that a legislator’s
probability for supporting a given policy position is related to the height of that
legislator’s density at the given position. Legislators have the highest probability of
supporting a policy position that lines up directly with the peak of their density. The
point in figure 2.3 labeled “Bill” represents the location of a yea vote for a particular
piece of legislation. First look at only the top panel. Both legislators A and B have
some probability of supporting the bill; however, Legislator-A has a higher probability
of supporting the bill than Legislator-B. The distance between the location of the Bill
and Legislator-A’s ideal point (peak) is smaller than the distance between Legislator-
B’s ideal point and the Bill. This same idea is relevant for candidates who are running
for oﬃce. PACs must form some belief about how diﬀerent candidates will vote when
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Figure 2.3: The Shape of Ideology
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faced with various policy choices. If a particular PAC would prefer a candidate who
would support the Bill, then in the top panel of figure 2.3, the PAC would choose to
donate money to Legislator-A.
PACs must also consider the shape of a candidate’s ideology. This point is illus-
trated in the bottom panel of figure 2.3. In the top panel, the legislators’ densities
have the same shape. But this does not have to be the case, and undoubtedly it is
not the case. The bottom panel of figure 2.3 shows a diﬀerent scenario. The location
of the Bill has not changed from the top panel; moreover, the legislators’ ideal points
have also remained unchanged. Thus, the distance between the Legislators’ ideal
points and the location of the Bill is the same in the bottom panel as it is in the top
panel—in which case the location of the Bill is still closer to Legislator-A’s ideal point
than it is to that of Legislator-B. The only diﬀerence between the top and bottom
panels are the slopes of the legislators’ densities. Specifically, the right-side slope
of Legislator-A’s ideology has gotten steeper and the left-side slope of Legislator-B’s
ideology has gotten flatter. Yet in the bottom panel, Legislator-B has a higher prob-
ability of voting for the Bill, than Legislator-A. This is because in the bottom panel
Legislator-B’s density is much wider than that of Legislator-A.
In both the top and bottom panels, Legislator-A is more liberal than Legislator-
B. However, in the bottom panel, Legislator-B finds a much wider range of policy
positions acceptable than does Legislator-A. When PACs make decisions about the
probability that a candidate will adopt a policy position that they find acceptable,
they must take into account the shape of a candidate’s ideology. If we replaced the
“Bill” in the two separate scenarios in figure 2.3 with a “PAC” and the legislators
with candidates, we could tell a similar story about which candidate a PAC should
support. In the top panel the PAC should support Candidate-A, but in the bottom
panel the PAC should support Candidate-B.
The statistical ramifications of this are relevant for summary measures of can-
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didates’ ideologies. In each election cycle, approximately 50 or so viable candidates
run in Senate elections. Over the course of 5 election cycles (2000 to 2008), there are
around 250 candidates. If we obtain separate measures of each candidates’ primary
and general ideologies, that comes to approximately 500 data points. It is not feasi-
ble to view 500 separate densities; thus, at some point summary measures for each
candidate will have to be used.
The two most obvious choices are the candidate mean and median points. The
more “normal” a given candidate’s density is (like the top panel of figure 2.3) the
closer the mean and median values will be. The diﬀerence between these two summary
measures will be minor. However, if candidate densities look more like the bottom
panel of figure 2.3 then the diﬀerence will be larger. Moreover, the choice of using
one over the other will become more consequential. Here I will use the candidate
mean values to represent summary measures of ideology. This choice fits with the
example illustrated in figure 2.3. If we chose to use the candidate median values then
we would have to change the expectation for the bottom panel of figure 2.3. The
expectations would change because although Legislator-B’s mean is closer to the Bill
in the bottom panel, Legislator-A’s median is still closer.
Methodology: Bayesian Inference
I used bayesian techniques, specifically Markov Chain Monte Carlo simulations, to
estimate the model displayed in equation 2.1. There are some good reasons for this
choice. First, I am exhausting the entire universe of PAC donations to Senate candi-
dates between the years 2000 and 2008. Jackman (2009) pointed out the following in
regards to datasets that incorporate all units of analysis, “there is no uncertainty due
to variation in repeated sampling from a population: the data available for analysis
exhaust the population of substantive interest” (page xxxi, emphasis in original). If
I were to take another “sample” of PAC donations to senate candidates, it would be
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identical (barring any coding errors) to what I have now. Since I am not interested
in making inferences about the likelihood of the data, it would not be appropriate to
make inferences based on standard errors and p-values. Thus, a bayesian approach
that allows me to make inferences about the model based on the data is much more
appropriate.
This approach also allows me to use each individual candidate as an independent
unit of analysis. Other studies have used each election (McCarty and Poole, 1998)
or contributor-candidate pairs (Bonica, 2010), as units of analysis. For the purposes
of those studies, their units of analysis were more than satisfactory. However, for
the purposes of this study, using individual candidates as the units of analysis is
more appropriate. This is particularly important when estimating candidate ideology
during primary campaigns, since the candidates may look quite similar and receive
donations from similar PACs. For example, if two Senate candidates are running
against each other and both receive donations from the National Rifle Association
(a conservative interest group), I will not have to decide which candidate is more
preferred by the NRA. In this case, the model will simply continue to estimate the
candidates’ ideologies regardless of whether or not they are running against each
other.
Another benefit to using this approach is that I do not need to assume that PAC
donations are independent of one another. It could be the case that some PACs
take cues from others. For example, if the NRA donated to a few candidates, some
conservative PACs may decide to donate based on the NRA’s decision. In the same
example, liberal PACs may also take the NRA’s donation as a cue to not donate
money to a candidate. It could also be the case that the conservative PACs would
not give money to the candidates who received donations from the NRA because
those candidates would not need the money. There are several ways that indepen-
dence across donations could be violated. However, previous research that used ML
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estimation had to assume that donations were independent.
The number of parameters that need to be estimated can become quite large. Us-
ing ML estimators to optimize models with so many parameters is problematic (recall
the earlier discussion about the “incidental parameters problem.”). It is computation-
ally diﬃcult to compute standard errors for ML estimates since the PAC-candidate
matrices are so large they cannot be directly inverted. Moreover, ML estimators
lose some of their desirable properties, most notably consistency, as the number of
incidental parameters increases (Neyman and Scott, 1948). On the other hand, the
Bayesian approach used here—building up a Monte Carlo based approximation by
sampling from conditional densities—is much more computationally eﬃcient.
Finally, according to Jackman (2009), one of the most important inferential ques-
tions facing latent variable models is what should we believe about the latent variables
given the observed indicators. The Bayesian approach I use here provides a straight-
forward answer to this question.3
However, there is still another hurdle to cross. Consider the following scenario
where two individual candidates, IL and IC have diﬀerent ideological preferences. Let
us say that IL has liberal preferences and IC has conservative preferences. If we
would like to estimate the extent of their diﬀerences, we would have to quantify the
concepts liberal and conservative. Now say that we use the equation, IL + IC = 0,
to estimate these quantities. We would find that the equation could be satisfied by
substituting IL=2 and IC=–2. However, IL=–2 and IC=2 would also work. The point
is that as long as IL and IC are opposite one another, the substantive interpretation
of the estimates will remain the same. The problem this poses is that the candidates
could appear to have a bimodal distributions. One way to think about a bimodal
3In general, Bayesian inference provides for straightforward interpretation of inferential questions.
Bayes Theorem for continuous parameters is: p(θ|y) ∝ p(y|θ)p(θ). It is read as the probability of
the posterior distribution is proportional to the likelihood times the prior distribution. But if you
replace θ with “hypothesis” and y with “evidence” you could read this theorem as: the probability
of my hypothesis given the evidence, is based on the likelihood of the evidence given my hypothesis
augmented by my prior beliefs about my hypothesis.
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distribution is that some variable x has an expected value of Y with probability α,
but with probability 1 − α the expected value of x is Z. As the algorithm samples
values over the distribution there is a chance that it will sample values where IL=2
and IL=–2. Technically this would entail an identification problem, and ultimately
we would be left with a bimodal distribution.
To solve this dilemma, Clinton, Jackman and Rivers (2004) argued, “In d-dimensional
choice spaces, d(d+1) linearly independent a priori restrictions on the ideal points are
required for identification” (page 357). Here I follow this recommendation and fix the
values of two candidates and force two PACs into truncated distributions.4 After the
prior distributions are set and the dimensional space is identified, values are sampled
across the parameter space based on the probability of the posterior distribution:
p(θ|y) ∝ p(y|θ)p(θ). This is read as the probability of the posterior distribution is pro-
portional to the likelihood times the prior distribution. For my purposes, I would
ask: what can we learn about a candidate’s ideology, by looking at the PACs that
donated to the candidate’s campaign?
Ideally, all PACs and candidates would be included in the estimation, but it
would not be possible to estimate the ideology of candidates who did not receive
any PAC donations. In the same regard, it would not be possible to estimate PAC
ideology for PACs that did not donate to any candidates. Initially I used the number
10 as a cutoﬀ point. If a candidate received donations (of $100 or more) from 10
or more diﬀerent PACs, then he or she was included in the analysis. Furthermore,
PACs were required to have given donations (of $100 or more) to at least 10 diﬀerent
4The liberal candidate was fixed at -1.3 and the conservative at 1.3. After the dimension was
estimated and all of the other candidates had ideal points, the ideal points of the candidates with fixed
values were estimated while holding all of the other candidates at their ideal points. In 2000 Kennedy
from Massachusetts was the liberal candidate and Burns from Montana was the conservative. In
2002 the liberal candidate was Durbin from Illinois, and the conservative was Inhofe from Oklahoma.
In 2004 Schumer of New York was the liberal, and Bunning from Kentucky was the conservative.
In 2006 Menendez from New Jersey was the liberal, and Kyl from Arizona was the conservative.
In 2008 Franken from Minnesota was the liberal, and Chambliss of Georgia was the conservative.
PACs were chosen based on how liberal or conservative the candidates they donated to were. In
most cases, a labor PAC ended up to be the liberal PAC, and a corporate PAC was the conservative.
44
candidates, to be included in the analysis. Dropping candidates or PACs that did not
receive or give enough donations is analogous to dropping unanimous roll call votes.
Unanimous roll call votes, or in this case candidates or PACs that did not receive or
give donations, provide no information about the dimensional space that we wish to
describe. However, using this criterion left me with more than 500 PACs for each
election and with a large majority of candidates receiving donations from more than
100 of those PACs. Even with two candidates’ positions fixed, the models still had
trouble identifying many of the other candidates’ positions, which resulted in bimodal
distributions. Thus, I used a second criterion to reduce the number of PACs. PACs
that did not show a certain amount of discrimination based on party identification
were excluded from the analysis. Specifically, a PAC needed to focus 70 percent of
its donation choices to members of a single party to be included in the analysis.
With these strict criteria, the number of PACs became much more manageable.
For example, during the 2000 general election campaign 189 PACs met these require-
ments. Figure 2.4 illustrates the number of candidates that each PAC gave to during
the 2000 general election campaign. Most PACs donated money to somewhere be-
tween 10 and 20 candidates. In some years more PACs were included and in other
years there were less, but overall this represents a fairly typical election year.
The summary statistics for the candidate characteristics included in the matrix X
are displayed in table 2.1. Party ID is coded -1 for Democrats, 1 for Republicans, and
0 for all others. Incumbent is coded 1 for incumbents and 0 for non-incumbents. Com-
mittee Chair is coded 1 if the candidate was the chair of a standing Senate Committee
during the session preceding the election. Open Seat is coded 1 if the incumbent is
not running for reelection, and 0 if he or she is running for reelection. Primary Elec-
tion Competition was coded as 0 if the candidate was unopposed during the primary
election, and 1 if the candidate was opposed. General Election Competition is based
on candidate vote share. Specifically, the general election vote share percent was
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Figure 2.4: PAC Donations - 2000 General Campaign
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normalized for each year and folded. Thus, higher values indicate more competition.
Table 2.1 indicates that the largest value was -.004. This value represents a vote share
that was extremely close to 50 percent.
Table 2.1: Candidate Variable Descriptions
Standard
Variable Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum
Party ID -.004 .993 -1 1
Incumbent .486 .500 0 1
Committee Chair .075 .264 0 1
Open Seat .224 .417 0 1
Primary Election Competition .660 .474 0 1
General Election Competition -1.02 .666 -3.99 -.004
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Candidate Ideology Results
Table 2.2 displays point estimates and credible intervals associated with the Senate
candidate characteristics. The top half of the table has the estimates from the primary
campaigns, and the bottom half of the table includes the estimates from the general
election campaigns. The coding of Party IDmeans that a positive coeﬃcient indicates
that PACs were more likely to donate money to Republican candidates. During
primary campaigns PACs were always more likely to donate to Democratic candidates
than to Republican candidates. However during general election campaigns it was
mixed. In 2002 PACs were more likely to donate to Democrats, but in 2004 they were
more likely to donate to Republicans.
In both primary and general election campaigns PACs are more likely to donate
money to Incumbents. However, this eﬀect is especially strong during primary cam-
paigns. However in one instance, the 2004 general election campaign, incumbency
decreased the likelihood that a PAC would donate to the candidate. The estimated
eﬀects of occupying a committee chair were also strange. According to table 2.2 com-
mittee chairmanship decreases the probability that a PAC will donate to candidate
during both primary and general election campaigns.
The eﬀects of competition and open seat status both performed as expected.
Running in a competitive race increased a candidate’s probability of receiving a PAC
donation. This was true during both general and primary campaigns. Running for
an open seat also increased a candidate’s chance of receiving a PAC donation. The
eﬀect of running for an open seat was especially clear during the general election
campaigns.
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Table 2.2: Parameter Estimates from Candidate Characteristics
Primary Campaigns
Point Estimates and Standard Errors
Variable 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
Party ID -0.143 -0.266∗ -0.419∗ -0.368∗ -0.163
(0.14) (0.06) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09)
Incumbent 1.063∗ 0.894∗ 0.775∗ 0.778∗ 1.458∗
(0.13) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13)
Committee Chair -0.577 -0.533∗ -0.567∗ -0.835∗ -0.892∗
(0.30) (0.26) (0.16) (0.20) (0.24)
Competition -0.215 0.639∗ 0.167 0.466∗ 0.670∗
(0.17) (0.14) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13)
Open Seat 0.347 0.438∗ -0.193 0.236 1.713∗
(0.23) (0.20) (0.15) (0.24) (0.24)
General Campaigns
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
Party ID 0.083 -0.239∗ 0.193∗ -0.042 -0.030
(0.08) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06)
Incumbent 0.290 0.438∗ -0.170∗ 0.356∗ 0.157
(0.22) (0.06) (0.08) (0.11) (0.09)
Committee Chair -0.577∗ -0.513∗ -0.510∗ -0.255 -0.763∗
(0.26) (0.13) (0.16) (0.21) (0.16)
Competition 0.161 0.332∗ 0.593∗ 0.272∗ 0.064
(0.13) (0.04) (0.08) (0.11) (0.07)
Open Seat 0.977∗ 1.350∗ 1.837∗ 0.856∗ 0.721∗
(0.22) (0.11) (0.17) (0.20) (0.12)
Significance Levels: ∗p ≤ .05, two-tailed tests.
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Candidate Estimates
In a perfect world I would show the posterior densities of all the candidate ideologies,
but this would add too many pages. I contemplated showing up to nine candidate
densities on each page. However, even by showing this many densities on each page, I
would have added more than 70 additional pages. Therefore, I have chosen to use the
mean value of each candidate’s ideology to summarize the results of the estimation.5
That being said, to illustrate the idea I did include figure 2.5 which illustrates the
densities of nine candidate ideologies for the 2002 general election campaign.
The candidates in figure 2.5 include four Democrats, all four were incumbents.
There are five Republicans included in the figure, four of which were challengers and
one was an incumbent. In all of the states represented in the figure an incumbent was
running for reelection, with the exception of North Carolina, which was an open seat.
The x-axises are the ideology estimates. Positive numbers represent a conservative
ideology, and negative numbers represent a liberal ideology.
In general, the densities in figure 2.5 seem to agree with what we know about
political parties and ideology. The Republican candidates all have positive estimates,
indicating a conservative ideology; while the Democratic candidates all have nega-
tive estimates, indicating a liberal ideology. When we look closer at the individuals
and their specific ideological inclinations, we also see that the estimates are quite
reasonable. Before his untimely death, the Democratic Senator Paul Wellstone from
Minnesota was considered a strong progressive liberal. On the other hand, Senator
Max Baucus from Montana, also a Democrat, is considered to be much more moder-
ate. Wellstone’s density lies primarily between -1 and -1.4, whereas Baucus’ density
is between -0.3 and -0.7. This indicates that Wellstone is “more” liberal, or further
to the left than Baucus. Moreover, it also means that there are policy outcomes that
5See Jackman (2009) pages 23-24 for a justification of using point estimates to summarize the
results of a bayesian posterior density.
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Figure 2.5: General Election 2002 Candidate Estimates
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Wellstone would like, but that Baucus would find too liberal. We can tell a similar
story when we look at the Republican candidates Norm Coleman from Minnesota and
Elizabeth Dole from North Carolina. Coleman’s density is between 0.6 and 1, but
Dole’s is between 1 and 1.6. Although Elizabeth Dole was not the most conservative
member of the Republican party, she was certainly more conservative than Norm
Coleman, who was a fairly moderate Republican.
Rather than showing 70 pages of these densities and drawing hundreds of com-
parisons, from this point forward I will use the mean value of each candidate’s den-
sity and simply refer to this summary measure as the candidate’s ideology. Figure
2.6 illustrates the relationship between this summary measure of candidate primary
ideology and a roll-call based measure of legislator ideology, namely 1st dimension
DW-Nominate scores. Candidate primary ideology is plotted on the vertical axis
and DW-Nominate scores are on the horizontal axis. The ‘D’s and ‘R’s represent
Democrats and Republicans, respectively. Since DW-Nominate scores are based on
roll-call votes, they can only be estimated for Legislators. This means that candidates
who have never served in Congress are not included in the figure.
Figure 2.6 indicates that there is a very strong relationship between candidate
primary ideology and 1st dimension DW-Nominate scores (the two measures correlate
at .881). The correlation between DW-Nominate scores and candidate general ideol-
ogy is an even higher (.898). Table 2.3 displays how well the candidate primary and
general ideology point estimates fit with DW-Nominate and party identification. Both
of the measures of ideology are highly correlated with their DW-Nominate scores and
with their party identification. Candidate primary ideology is correlated with party
identification at .907, and general ideology is correlated at .893. Furthermore, the
candidates’ primary ideologies are also highly correlated with their general ideologies
(.873).
51
Figure 2.6: Relationship Between Primary Ideology and DW-Nominate
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Note: This only includes Senate candidates who had DW-Nominate scores.
Table 2.3: Primary and General Ideology Correlations
Party ID DWNOM1 Primary Ideology
DWNOM1 .920 —— ——
Primary Ideology .907 .881 ——
General Ideology .893 .898 .873
Note: This only includes Senate candidates who had DW-Nominate scores.
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Another way to analyze how well these measures capture ideology is by looking
at non-incumbent candidates who won the general election and subsequently received
ideology scores based on their roll call votes. Over the course of the five election cycles
covered from 2000 to 2008 there were only 23 Democratic and 19 Republican Senate
candidates who fit this criteria. That being said, the results are displayed in figure
2.7. The figure shows that the PAC-based ideology measures and the subsequent
DW-Nominate scores of non-incumbent candidates who were ultimately elected are
correlated at about .93. This means that with my PAC-based ideology measures—
estimated prior to a candidate ever taking oﬃce—I can predict, with a large amount
of accuracy, how candidates will vote after they take oﬃce.
Figure 2.7: General Ideology and DW-Nominate
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Note: This only includes non-incumbent Senate candidates who won the general election.
Table 2.4 illustrates the correlations between candidate party identification, 1st
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dimension DW-Nominate scores, and the PAC-based primary and general ideology
measures. The PAC-based ideology measures correlate very well with both candi-
date party identification and DW-Nominate scores. The PAC-based primary ideol-
ogy measure correlates .951 with party identification and .913 with 1st dimension
DW-Nominate scores. The PAC-based general ideology measure correlates .967 with
party identification and .930 with DW-Nominate scores.
Table 2.4: Non-incumbent Winners
Party ID DWNOM1 Primary Ideology
DWNOM1 .950 —— ——
Primary Ideology .951 .913 ——
General Ideology .967 .930 .938
Note: This only includes non-incumbent Senate candidates who subsequently won the election.
These results further confirm that the PAC-based ideology measures do a very
good job of predicting how a candidate will vote if he or she were to win the election.
This also indicates that PACs do have a handle on candidate ideology and that PAC
donations are linked to ideological proximity. With accurate measures of Senate
candidates’ primary and general ideologies in hand, the next chapter is devoted to
estimating the states’ primary and general ideologies.
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Chapter 3
State Ideology and Candidate
Location Choice
There is a great deal of heterogeneity among the fifty states that encompass the
United States. This is true in relation to geography and demography. According to
the Census Bureau, California, the most populated state, has more than 37 million
people living there. This is approximately 12 percent of the total U.S. population. On
the other hand, only one-half of a million people live in Wyoming, the least populated
state. This is less than two-tenths of a percent of the total U.S. population. California
has 237 people per square mile, which is far less than New Jersey’s 1,200 people per
square mile. Wyoming has 5.6 people per square mile, which is nearly 5 times higher
than Alaska’s 1.2 people per square mile.
If we look at diﬀerences in the racial makeup of states we would also find a wide
variety of diﬀerences. Sixty-one percent of California’s large population is white.
But this is much lower than Vermont’s 96 percent white population. The state with
the lowest percentage of whites is Hawaii at 27 percent. The south still has the
largest concentrations of African Americans. African Americans make up 26 percent
of Alabama’s population, 30 percent of Georgia’s population, and 37 percent of Mis-
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sissippi’s population. Maryland is one of the only places outside of the south that
even comes close to having the same proportion of African Americans with about
29 percent of the state’s total population. The proportion of African Americans is
extremely small in some of the North-east states and the North-west states. African
Americans makeup about 1 percent of the populations of Maine, Vermont, and New
Hampshire. In Idaho, Montana, Wyoming, Utah, North Dakota, and South Dakota
African Americans constitute less than 1 percent of the states’ populations.
As diﬀerent as the states are among each other, there is also a lot of heterogeneity
within the states themselves. In Wisconsin, Milwaukee County has a total population
of about 1 million people, and 25 percent of that population are African Americans.
But inWaukesha County (the counties are adjacent to each other) the total population
is about 380,000 people an only 1.4 percent are African Americans. Prince George’s
County in Maryland has 840,000 people residing there, 64 percent of which are African
Americans. The city of Baltimore also has a large proportion of African Americans,
63.5 percent of the 640,000 total population. Howard County and Anne Arundel
County lie between Prince George’s County and Baltimore. Howard County’s total
population is 275,000 people and 17 percent of them are African American. Anne
Arundel County has a larger population, 514,000 people, with a smaller percentage
of them being African American, less than 15 percent. I could obviously go on and
on. The point is that there are many diﬀerences within and among the states. The
diﬀerence between the primary voters and general election voters in each state, is
particularly relevant.
Diﬀerent Electorates
Senate candidates must win their party’s primary election before they can carry
the party’s label into the general election. States have a variety of laws governing
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primary elections. In some states, individuals must register as a party member before
they are allowed to vote in that particular party’s primary election. In other states,
individuals can vote in either parties’ primary election regardless of their partisan
aﬃliation. Either way, if an individual votes in one party’s primary election, that
individual cannot then vote in the other party’s primary election.
Often primary voters are seen as being more engaged and more ideological than
the average general election voter. Scholars have debated whether or not primary
voters are representative of the rest of the population and those who have studied
the representativeness of primary electorates have had conflicting results. Initially,
studies found that primary electorates were unrepresentative (Ranney, 1968, 1972).
However, later studies challenged this conclusion (Bartels, 1988; Geer, 1988; Norran-
der, 1989). Geer (1988) argued that the comparison groups used by earlier studies
were problematic. According to Geer (1988) past studies had compared primary vot-
ers to those who did not vote in the primary (Ranney and Epstein, 1966; Ranney,
1968, 1972), to party identifiers (Kritzer, 1977), and to voters in the general election
(DiNitto and Smithers, 1972). Geer argued that these comparisons were potentially
misleading because they could have included individuals who did not vote for the
party in the general election. He claimed that a better comparison would be pri-
mary voters to individuals who are likely to turnout in the general election and are
potential supporters of the party in that election (Geer, 1988, page 931). From this
comparison, he found that there was little diﬀerence between primary voters and the
general electorate.
However, even if the exact same individuals who voted in the primary elections
vote in the general election, and only those same individuals, the candidates still face
a dramatically diﬀerent general electorate from the primary electorate. An example
of this is illustrated in figure 3.1.
There are 3 densities included in figure 3.1. The Democratic Primary Electorate,
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Figure 3.1: Diﬀerent Electorates
Ideology
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the Republican Primary Electorate, and the General Election Electorate. The Gen-
eral Election Electorate was obtained by combining the Democratic and Republican
Primary Electorates. Even in this case, where no additional non-primary voters were
included in the General Electorate, there are clear diﬀerences among all three of the
electorates. Although the distributions will not be identical, there still should be a
diﬀerence between these diﬀerent electorates in each state. Moreover, a candidate
will need to please two of the electorates, his or her party’s primary electorate and
the general electorate, before he or she can win the Senate seat.
If a candidate wants to get elected, she will have to convince the voters that
electing her will benefit them more than electing her opponent. Arguably, candidates
attempt to convince the voters by placing themselves in the ideological dimension by
alluding to their stances on various policies.1 Voters then base their vote choice on
the ideological congruency between the candidates and themselves. The candidate
whose ideology is closest to the median voter’s ideology will win the election. This
summarizes a simple spatial model of vote choice. For the purposes of this study, this
means I will need to obtain measures for both primary electorates’ ideologies and the
general electorate’s ideology in each state.
Estimating State Ideologies
To understand if and how candidate primary positions aﬀect their vote share in the
general election, I need to estimate three ideology measures for each state. One ideol-
ogy measure for the general electorate, another for the Democratic primary electorate,
and another for the Republican primary electorate. Researchers have used several
methods to obtain state-wide measures of attitudes based on survey responses. The
earliest attempts used national data to estimate demographic correlations and then
1It could also be the case that candidates specifically avoid making policy statements so they will
not have to defend them. However, eventually most candidates are forced to make some ideologically
defining policy statements.
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weighted the estimates based on state demographic totals (Pool, Abelson and Pop-
kin, 1965). However, researchers were concerned that this did not take geography into
account. States with similar demographic characteristics would end up having the
same estimates. This lead to a disaggregation method by Erikson, Wright and McIver
(1993) in which geography was taken into account. However, in order to obtain suf-
ficiently large sample sizes, the disaggregation method often had to pool data across
large periods of time. For many questions in political science this is not a reasonable
solution. Recently, Lax and Phillips (2009) compared the disaggregation method to
another using multilevel modeling and found that the estimates obtained from the
multilevel models were superior. They found that multilevel modeling outperformed
disaggregation especially well when sample sizes were small. To obtain estimates of
state ideology, I used the recent multilevel modeling approach forwarded by Lax and
Phillips (2009).
Equation 3.1 illustrates the individual model used to estimate state ideology.
Parameters labeled with β’s represent fixed eﬀects and α’s represent random eﬀects.
Fixed eﬀects do not vary across states and include measures of state institutional
ideologies, citizen ideologies, vote share of Democratic Presidential Candidate, and
Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
Ideologyi = β0 + βinstit ideol1 + β
civ ideol
2 + β
Dem Pct
3 + β
gdp
4
+ αrace, sexg[i ] + α
age, edu
a[i ] + α
job
j [i ] + α
married
m[i ] + α
kids
k [i ] + α
state
s[i ] + α
region
r [i ] (3.1)
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αrace, sexg ∼ N(0,σ2race, sex ), for g = 1, . . . , 8
αage, edua ∼ N(0,σ2age, edu), for a = 1, . . . , 16
αjobj ∼ N(0,σ2job), for j = 1, . . . , 4
αmarriedm ∼ N(0,σ2married ), for m = 1, . . . , 4 (3.2)
αkidsk ∼ N(0,σ2kids), for k = 1, . . . , 3
αstates ∼ N(0,σ2state), for s = 1, . . . , 50
αregionr ∼ N(0,σ2region), for r = 1, . . . , 9
On the other hand random eﬀects do vary by state. Thus measures must be available
at both the individual and state levels. These include variables measuring race,
sex, age, education, employment status, marital status, number of children, state,
and region. Each random eﬀect is modeled with a mean of 0 and a variance of σ2.
Equation 3.2 displays the distributional assumptions of the random eﬀects.
The data used to estimate the state ideologies came from a number of places. The
Annenberg National Election Studies (NAES) were used to estimate individual level
ideology responses. I used the NAES because they have a large sample of primary
voters across nearly all states which allowed me to obtain ideology measures of those
electorates. I used census data for weighting and post-stratification of the individual
level ideology responses. Thus, any random eﬀect in the model must be contained in
both the NAES and the Census data. Data on state Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
came from the Bureau of Economic Analysis which is part of the U.S. Department of
Commerce.2 Vote share for Al Gore in 2000 and John Kerry in 2004 came from the
2The GDP data was downloaded from http://www.bea.gov/index.htm
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Federal Elections Commission (FEC).3 Institutional ideology and state citizen ideol-
ogy are updated measures associated with Berry et al. (1998).4 State institutional
ideologies were estimated by combining the ideology scores of each state’s governor,
state legislature, and the parties within the state legislature (Berry et al., 1998, page
332-333). States’ citizen ideologies were formulated by using the ADA and COPE
scores of House incumbents and challengers, weighted by the amount of support they
received during the election, and then aggregating all the state’s congressional dis-
tricts (Berry et al., 1998, page 331).
Results
Table 3.1 displays the estimates for the fixed eﬀects and table 3.2 displays the es-
timated means and variances for the random eﬀects. Looking first at table 3.1, the
estimated fixed eﬀects from six models are included. The 2000 Democratic Primary
Electorate’s ideology, the 2000 Republican Primary Electorate’s ideology, the 2000
general election electorate’s ideology, and the same three ideology estimates for 2004.
Because I used the NAES, the dependent variables are measures of ideology scaled
from 1 being the most liberal to 5 being the most conservative.
The citizen and institutional ideology variables are measured such that 0 is the
most conservative possible and 100 is the most liberal possible. Since the dependent
variables are scaled from 1 to 5 in the opposite direction, we should expect that the
citizen and institutional ideology variables would have a negative eﬀect. This is pre-
cisely what we see with the citizen ideology variable. Liberal citizens are associated
with liberal general election voters, and relatively liberal Republican primary elec-
torates. However, the eﬀects of citizen ideology were not significant in either of the
3Vote share data came from http://www.fec.gov/
4The data was downloaded from Richard Fording’s website:
http://www.uky.edu/ rford/stateideology.html
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Table 3.1: 2000 & 2004 State Ideology - Fixed Eﬀects
2000 2004
Fixed Eﬀects Dem General Repub Dem General Repub
Citizen Ideology -0.001 -0.002∗ -0.005∗ -0.002 -0.003∗ -0.005∗
Institutional Ideology 0.001 0.0007∗ 0.001∗ 0.001∗ 0.0002 -0.0002
Gore/Kerry Vote % -0.586∗ -0.820∗ -0.043 -0.593 -0.735∗ 0.610
Per Capita GDP -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.0001∗ -0.00001∗ -0.00001∗
Constant 3.396∗ 3.629∗ 3.646∗ 3.541∗ 3.881∗ 3.879∗
Significance Levels: ∗p ≤ .05, two-tailed test.
Democratic models.
The institutional ideology variable did not have the eﬀect I expected. It should
have performed similarly to the citizen ideology variable, but it did not. Further
analysis revealed that the two variables have a fairly strong correlation (.585). It could
be that removing citizen ideology would change the estimated eﬀect of institutional
ideology, or that removing institutional ideology would temper the eﬀect of citizen
ideology. However, I would point out that the substantive aﬀect of institutional
ideology is much smaller than that of citizen ideology. So taken together, the overall
aﬀect is still in the direction that we expected.
The variable labeled “Gore/Kerry Vote %” performed as expected. The eﬀect
indicates that Democratic Primary electorates and General election electorates in
2000 that voted heavily for Gore were more liberal than those that did not favor Gore
as much. The eﬀect of Kerry votes indicated that the General electorates in states
that supported Kerry in 2004 were much more liberal than the General Electorates
in states that supported him less. The variable measuring per capita GDP is not
significant in any of the 2000 models, but is significant and negative in all of the 2004
models. This eﬀect indicates that states with higher per capita GDP were more likely
to be liberal than states with lower per capita GDP.
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The random eﬀects are displayed in table 3.2. The layout of the table is slightly
diﬀerent from that of table 3.1. Table 3.2 includes the mean and variance of the
models’ random eﬀects. The top half of the table includes the eﬀects for the three
models estimated for the year 2000, and the bottom half has the eﬀects for the 2004
models. Since there are multiple categories for each variable (e.g. the “State” variable
has 50 categories) and separate eﬀects are estimated for each category, displaying all
of the estimated eﬀects for each variable would be needlessly extensive. For this
reason, I included the mean and variance of the eﬀects for each variable in table 3.2.
Nearly all of the mean random eﬀects are displayed in scientific notation. Con-
verting these into standard numbers simply entails moving the decimal point the
number of spaces indicated by the exponent. For example, the mean random eﬀect
for the “Race, Sex” variable in the 2000 Democrat model is 4.9e−13. The standard
number would be 0.00000000000049. So for all intents and purposes, all of the mean
random eﬀects in table 3.2 are zero. Looking at the variances tells us that the eﬀects
are diﬀerent across the variables’ categories.
The “Race, Sex” variable in the 2004 General model has a mean of -3.7e−12 and
a variance of .009. If we looked closer at this specific variable, we would see that the
largest positive eﬀect, indicating a conservative direction, was associated with white
males at 0.17. The largest negative eﬀect, which indicates a liberal direction, was -.11
and associated with black males.
Many of the other variables also performed as expected. Looking at the “Job”
variable in the 2004 General model, the strongest conservative eﬀect was estimated
for individuals who were self-employed (α=0.030). And the strongest liberal eﬀect
was estimated for government workers (α=-0.033). The most conservative eﬀect for
the “Region” variable was 0.085 estimated for a region in the south. Whereas the
most liberal eﬀect was estimated for New England and was -0.071.
Figures 3.2 and 3.3 illustrate each state’s general electorate ideology, Democratic
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Table 3.2: 2000 & 2004 State Ideology - Random Eﬀects
2000 Democrat General Republican
Random Eﬀects Mean σ2 Mean σ2 Mean σ2
Race, Sex 4.9e−13 0.004 2.5e−11 0.010 -2.0e−12 0.009
Age, Edu -9.2e−14 0.041 6.2e−13 0.011 -1.3e−13 0.004
Job 6.5e−13 0.003 -2.8e−12 0.001 -1.3e−12 0.004
Married 5.2e−13 0.004 7.2e−12 0.009 2.8e−12 0.004
Kids -2.0e−12 0.004 2.4e−11 0.012 -4.0e−13 0.006
State 1.9e−15 0.001 7.1e−15 0.001 0 2.9e−11
Region -1.0e−12 0.010 2.5e−12 0.003 2.2e−13 0.004
2004 Democrat General Republican
Race, Sex 2.4e−12 0.008 -3.7e−12 0.009 -5.9e−14 0.008
Age, Edu -1.3e−13 0.063 -1.1e−12 0.022 -1.0e−15 0.005
Job 8.4e−15 1.0e−4 -4.3e−13 0.001 9.2e−13 0.002
Married 1.9e−14 0.005 7.3e−11 0.013 -1.5e−12 0.004
Kids 4.8e−12 0.002 -5.8e−11 0.024 1.3e−11 0.017
State 3.2e−14 0.002 -3.5e−14 0.002 3.1e−14 0.003
Region 1.5e−13 0.005 3.1e−13 0.004 -7.6e−14 0.002
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primary ideology, and Republican primary ideology. The states are ordered based on
the general electorate’s estimated ideology. From the most liberal—Massachusetts, to
the most conservative—Oklahoma. A label that ends in a ‘D’ represents the estimate
for the specific state’s Democratic primary electorate ideology. Labels that end in an
‘R’ are for the Republican primary ideology. And the labels that contain only the
state’s two-letter abbreviation represent the general electorate ideology.
There are several things to notice about these figures. First oﬀ there is a lot
of variation in the location and spread among state ideologies. In some states, the
Democratic electorate is much closer to the general electorate than the Republican
electorate. For example, the Democratic electorates in Massachusetts and Vermont
are much closer to the general electorate than the Republican electorate. In other
states, the opposite is true. In Wyoming and North Dakota, the Republican elec-
torates are much closer to the general electorates than are the Democratic electorates.
In some states, both the Democratic and Republican electorates are close to the gen-
eral electorate (and fairly close to each other), such as West Virginia, Alabama, and
Oklahoma. However in other states, such as Oregon, Washington, and Iowa, they are
all very far apart.
Another thing to notice is that states tend to be on the conservative side of the
ideological dimension. In fact, in 2000 only 3 states’ general electorates were on the
liberal side of the dimension (Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Hawaii). In 2004
(figure 3.3) only Massachusetts and Vermont had general electorates that were left
of the “Moderate” category. In many states, the Democratic electorate is actually
more conservative than other states’ general electorates. But the only Republican
electorates that are more liberal than any states general electorates are Delaware in
2004, which is more liberal than Oklahoma’s and Mississippi’s general electorates, and
New Jersey’s 2004 Republican electorate, which is also more liberal than Oklahoma’s
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Figure 3.2: State General and Primary Electorate Ideologies - 2000
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Figure 3.3: State General and Primary Electorate Ideologies - 2004
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general electorate.
There also seems to be a semi-systemic shift towards the conservative side of the
ideological spectrum between 2000 and 2004. In 2004 the average Republican primary
electorate was 3.1 percent more conservative than they were in 2000. The average
General election electorate was 3 percent more conservative in 2004 than they were
in 2000. However, there was almost no diﬀerence between the average Democratic
primary electorate in 2000 and 2004.
Finally, I wanted to point out that, generally speaking, these figures tend to
coincide with what we know (or what I think we know) about the states’ ideologies.
Many of the states in the Northeast are very liberal. For example, if we look at
rights for gays and lesbians, we would see that same-sex marriage is permitted in one
form or another in Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Vermont. Moreover, New
York, Rhode Island, and Maryland all recognize same-sex marriages. And same-sex
unions are permitted in New Jersey, Maine, and Maryland. The Northeastern U.S. is
much more progressive when it comes to rights for gays and lesbians than most other
regions. When we look at figures 3.2 and 3.3, we see that many of these Northeastern
states have estimated ideologies that place them as the some of the most liberal states
in the U.S.
In the same light, many states in the South and Northern-Midwest are considered
to be some of the most conservative in the U.S. If we look at ADA scores, Southern
Republicans and Southern Democrats consistently score lower (indicating a more
conservative voting record) than the rest of their parties. Moreover, some of the most
conservative Democrats come from states like New Mexico, Utah, and Idaho. For
example, in 2009, Teague (D-NM) and Matheson (D-UT) both received ADA scores
of 55. Marshall (D-GA), Minnick (D-ID), McIntyre (D-NC), and Davis (D-TN) all
received ADA scores of 50. The most conservative Democrats in 2009 were Boren (D-
OK) who got a 40, Taylor (D-MS) who scored a 35, and Bright (D-AL) who received a
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20. The only Senator to get an ADA score of 0 in 2009 was the Kentucky Republican
Bunning (R-KY).5 Figures 3.2 and 3.3 show that the model estimates coincide with
the view that many Southern and Northern-Midwest states are in fact conservative.
I feel confident that this estimation process has led to reasonable and reliable es-
timates of state Democratic and Republican Primary ideology, and general electorate
ideology. In the next section, I analyze the relationship between these state ideology
estimates and the candidate ideology measures that were estimated in Chapter 2.
Candidate Ideology and State Electorates
Figure 3.4 illustrates the relationship between Senate Candidates’ Primary ideologies
and the States’ Primary ideologies. Candidate primary ideology is plotted on the
vertical axis, and state primary ideologies are plotted on the horizontal axis.6 Can-
didate primary ideology is clearly related to their parties’ state primary electorate
ideology. Candidates from states with conservative primary electorates tend to be
more conservative than candidates from states with liberal primary electorates.
Since candidates need to win their party’s primary election to carry the party
label into the general election, it is not surprising that there is such a high correlation
between candidate primary ideology and the relevant party state primary ideology.
However, the relationship between candidate general ideology and state general ide-
ology is not nearly as strong (illustrated in figure 3.5). Candidate primary ideology
and state primary ideology is correlated at about .90, but candidate general ideology
and state general ideology is only correlated at about .25.
5The ADA scores came from http://www.adaction.org/media/votingrecords/2009.pdf
6In the Chapter 4, I develop a spatial model between candidate ideology and state ideology.
However, before I could construct the spatial model, I had to scale the measures so they would be
compatible. Thus, the state primary and general ideologies plotted in the remaining figures and
analysis are the scaled versions of these measures. I will discuss the scaling method in more detail
in the next chapter.
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Figure 3.4: Relationship Between Primary Ideology
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Figure 3.5: Relationship Between General Ideology
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Table 3.3 reports the correlations between candidate ideologies and state ideolo-
gies, for candidates who ran in both the primary and general election campaigns. The
table reveals that there is a stronger relationship between candidate general ideology
and state primary ideology, than between candidate general ideology and state gen-
eral ideology. Since candidate ideology location in the general election campaign is
restricted by their ideology position in the primary, party identification, information
quality, and uncertainty in the electorate, it is not surprising that there is a stronger
relationship.
Table 3.3: Correlation Between Candidate & State Ideology
State State
Primary Ideology General Ideology
Candidate Primary Ideology .934 .233
Candidate General Ideology .909 .269
Note: This only includes Senate candidates who ran in both the Primary and General Elections.
It could be the case that much of the relationship between state primary ideology
and candidate primary ideology comes from the fact that Democratic Primary voters
are more liberal than Republican Primary voters, regardless of the state. If electorate
ideology aﬀects candidate ideology location choice, then we should see this relation-
ship even within the parties. For example, Oklahoma’s Democratic Primary electorate
is much more conservative than Massachusetts. Thus, I would expect that Oklahoma
Democratic candidates would locate themselves to the right of Massachusetts’ Demo-
cratic candidates. In the same regard, Oklahoma Republican Primary voters are more
conservative than their Massachusetts brethren, and I would expect the Oklahoma
Republican candidates to locate themselves to the right of the Massachusetts Repub-
lican candidates. That being said, figure 3.6 illustrates the relationship between state
Republican primary electorate ideology and Republican candidate primary ideology.
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Figure 3.6: Republican Primary Ideology
R
R
R
R
R R
RR
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R R
R
RR
RR
R
R
R
RR
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
RRR
R
R
R
R
RR
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
RR
R
R
R
R R
R
R
R R
R
R
RR
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
RR
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
RR
R
R
R
R
R
R
Correlation=.436
Correlation=.436
isch (ID)
Risch (ID)
haf e (RI)
Chafee (RI)
-1
-1
0
0
1
1
2
2
3
3
epublica  Candidate Primary Ideology
Re
pu
bl
ica
n 
Ca
nd
id
at
e 
Pr
im
ar
y 
Id
eo
lo
gy
.5
.5 1
.5
1.5 2 2.5
State Republican Primary Ideology
State Republican Primary Ideology
74
Although much of the strength of the correlation is reduced when we separate the
parties (which was expected), there is still a strong relationship between Republican
state Primary ideology and Republican candidate primary ideology. Figure 3.6 shows
that the Primary ideologies of Republican voters and Republican candidates is corre-
lated at .436. So even when we control for the eﬀects of party, Republican candidates
from relatively liberal Republican primary states are more liberal than candidates
from states with relatively conservative Republican electorates. Senate Republicans
Lincoln Chaﬀee from Rhode Island and James Risch from Idaho are labeled in figure
3.6 to provide reference. Lincoln Chaﬀee was one of the most liberal Republicans
in the Senate, and Rhode Island is definitely one of the most liberal states. More-
over, Rhode Island’s Republican Primary electorate is among the more liberal. On
the other hand, James Risch is not the most conservative Republican in the Senate;
however, he is still much more conservative than the Republican median Senator.
Unsurprisingly, Risch’s state of Idaho is among the more conservative states, and its
Republican Primary electorate is more conservative than most.
Figure 3.7 illustrates the relationship between the ideology of states’ Democratic
Primary electorates and the ideology of Democratic Primary candidates. The corre-
lation among Democratic Primary electorates and their candidates is not as strong
as it was for Republicans. The correlation for Democrats is .350 and for Republicans
it is .436. However, even after controlling for the eﬀects of party, a fairly strong rela-
tionship still exists among the Democratic states and candidates. As I did in figure
3.6, I also labeled two Senators in figure 3.7 to serve as examples. Ben Nelson from
Nebraska is one of the most conservative Democrats in the Senate, and he comes from
one of the most conservative states. On the other hand, John Kerry, a Senator from
Massachusetts, is more liberal and represents a liberal state.
As displayed in table 3.3, when the parties are combined the relationship be-
tween candidate primary ideology and their respective party’s primary ideology was
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Figure 3.7: Democratic Primary Ideology
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extremely strong. However, when we controlled for party, the strength of the rela-
tionship was reduced. Table 3.3 also shows that candidate general ideology and state
general electorate ideology is not very strong (r=.269). Although candidates from
both parties are faced with the same General electorate, there is still a diﬀerence be-
tween the two parties. Table 3.4 shows the correlation between candidate and state
general ideologies, while controlling for party.
Table 3.4: Candidate & State General Ideology—Controlling for Party
State General Ideology
Republican General Ideology .156
Democratic General Ideology .248
Note: This only includes Senate candidates who ran in both the Primary and General Elections.
Table 3.4 shows that, overall, Democratic candidates are closer to their state gen-
eral electorate than are Republican candidates. This is interesting because Republi-
can candidates were closer to their party’s primary electorate than the Democratic
candidates were. However, since Democratic candidates are closer to the general elec-
torate that begs the question: are Democratic candidate better at shifting towards
the middle after the primary election is over? It may be tempting to answer “yes
they are,” but keep in mind that Democrats were further away from their relevant
primary electorates than the Republicans. It could be the case that Democrats place
themselves closer to the General electorate during the primary campaign, and that
the same amount of movement between the Democratic candidate and the Republi-
can candidate after the primary election places the Democrat closer to the General
electorate since he or she started closer in the first place. Further analyses revealed
that Democratic candidate primary ideologies were no more closely related to state
general electorate ideology than Republicans (r=.117 for Democrats, and r=.093 for
Republicans).
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Figure 3.8: General Ideology - Incumbent and Challengers
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There is no questioning the advantage that incumbents have during Congressional
elections. Figure 3.8 shows the relationship between state and candidate general cam-
paign ideology, while controlling for incumbency. The figure shows that incumbent
Senate candidates are vastly closer to their states’ general electorates than are chal-
lengers. This also raises the question: are incumbents better at shifting towards the
middle than challengers, or is it that incumbents primary ideology places them closer
to the general electorate than challengers? I try to answer this question in figure 3.9.
Figure 3.9: Primary Placement - Incumbent and Challengers
70% of Incumbents
35% of Challengers
48% of Challengers
14% of Incumbents
?2 ?1 0 1 2?0.25
Distance Towards General Electorate
Incumbents Challengers
There are two densities displayed in figure 3.9, the solid line represents the in-
cumbents and the dashed line represents challengers. There is only one axis—the
horizontal axis—and it measures the distance from the candidates’ primary positions
to the relevant party’s primary median voter. Positive values indicate candidates
who placed themselves between the primary median voter and the general median
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voter. A value of 0 means that the candidate primary ideology lined up precisely
with his or her party’s primary median voter. Negative values indicate candidates
who placed themselves on the far-side of their parties’ median voters. For Republican
candidates a negative value would indicate that the candidate was more conservative
than the median Republican primary voter. For Democratic candidates a negative
value indicates a candidate whose primary ideology is more liberal than the median
Democratic primary voter.
Figure 3.9 also includes two vertical lines (one on 0 and another on -0.25), and
some text with arrows. Any candidate who falls to the right of the vertical line at
the zero mark has a primary ideology that is more moderate than his or her party’s
median primary voter. Candidates that fall to the left of the zero mark have primary
ideologies that are more extreme than their parties’ median primary voters. The
figure shows that 70 percent of Senate incumbents were more moderate than their
party’s primary median voter. However, only 35 percent of challengers were more
moderate than their party’s median voter. Aside from being more extreme, the shape
of the challengers distribution is also skewed. To illustrate this diﬀerence in shape, I
included a vertical line at the -0.25 mark. Only 14 percent of incumbents were this
much more extreme than the primary median voter. However, a full 48 percent of
challengers were this much more extreme than their primary median voter. Figure
3.9 indicates that incumbent primary ideology is closer to the general electorate than
challenger primary ideology. This raises the question: why would challengers place
themselves on the extreme-side of their party’s median voter?
Not all challengers are created equal. Some challengers faced strong competition
during their primary, while others were essentially unopposed. Figure 3.10 diﬀerenti-
ates between challengers who were unopposed in their primary and challengers who
faced opposition. Figure 3.10 indicates that challengers who run unopposed during
the primary campaign, have primary ideologies closer to the general median voter,
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than challengers who face competition in their primary. This makes sense when you
consider that candidates who are faced with a tough primary campaign need to be
especially concerned with pleasing their primary voters. On the other hand, candi-
dates who are unopposed during the primary campaign can focus more on pleasing
the general electorate—which is more moderate.
Figure 3.10: Primary Placement - Challengers Only
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It could be the case that all candidates—even incumbents—who are faced with
a strong primary competitor react by placing themselves closer to their party’s pri-
mary median voter. If this is true, then the reason incumbents appear so moderate
compared to challengers could be attributed to the fact that they have less primary
competition. For example, from 2000 through 2008, only about 50 percent of Sen-
ate incumbents had any primary competition. However, most of those Senators did
not face strong competition. Less than 10 percent of incumbents who had primary
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opposition received 60 percent or less of the primary vote. So, among all the Senate
incumbents, only about 5 percent had any real primary competition.
Non-incumbents face a lot more primary competition. During the same time
period (2000-2008), 82 percent of Senate challengers faced some form of primary
competition. Moreover, nearly 60 percent of those challengers received 60 percent or
less of the primary vote. Among all Senate challengers, about 49 percent face strong
primary competition. This is much higher than the 5 percent of incumbents that face
strong primary competition. This could certainly help explain why challengers are
more extreme than incumbents.
Before moving on, I want to summarize what we have learned about candidate
ideology placement. First, candidate primary ideology is closely related to his or
her party’s primary ideology. This makes sense since candidates must win the pri-
mary to carry the party label into the general election. Second, candidates do not
align as close to the general median voter, as they do to the primary median voter.
Third, incumbent primary ideology is closer to the general election median voter than
challenger primary ideology. However, we also found that challengers who run un-
opposed during the primary campaign have a primary ideology closer to the general
electorate’s median voter than challengers who face competition during the primary.
That being said, only about 5 percent of incumbents received strong primary oppo-
sition. Moreover, unopposed challengers and incumbents seem to behave similarly.
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Chapter 4
Candidate Ideological Shifting
In 2010, Republican candidate and Tea Party favorite Sharron Angle lost her election
bid to unseat Harry Reid, the long standing Democratic Senator from Nevada. Dur-
ing her primary campaign, Angle portrayed herself as a staunch conservative. She
opposed mandating health care coverage for the treatment of autism. She argued
that the U.S. Social Security system should be phased out in favor of a system that
resembled the Chilean system created by the right-wing extremist and dictator, Au-
gusto Pinochet. She even mentioned the possibility of an armed popular uprising if
Congress did not change its course. Ultimately, it was this conservative message that
led to the Republican nomination; however, to win the general election, Angle would
need to moderate her message.
Although Angle’s conservative message resonated well with many Republicans,
the areas of Nevada that are heavily populated are not conservative strong holds. In
2008, Clark County and Washoe County, which together combined for approximately
86 percent of Nevada’s vote total, both saw Obama with double digit victories over
McCain. To win the general election, Angle would have to make a better showing in
these important counties than McCain had done two years earlier and restrain her
ardent conservatism. Just as Nixon had advised Bob Dole to “run like hell back to
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the center,” Angle’s campaign recognized that she needed to tone down her vigorous
conservative message to persuade enough general election voters to unseat the four
term, Democratic incumbent.
To moderate her platform, Angle removed the website she used during the pri-
mary campaign and launched a new website that eliminated some of her more con-
troversial statements. For example, she backed away from her view that the U.S.
Department of Education was unconstitutional and should be dismantled. She also
concealed her support for a facility to dump nuclear waste at Yucca Mountain. Evi-
dence of her shift made national headlines when the Reid campaign called attention
to it.
Sharron Angle’s (R) U.S. Senate campaign sent a cease and desist let-
ter to Sen. Harry Reid’s campaign (D-NV) last week “after a copy of
her pre-primary election website was relaunched,” the Nevada Appeal re-
ports. “After winning the June 8 primary, Angle took down her website
and relaunched a new, glossier and trimmer version on Thursday. Reid’s
campaign then launched a copy of Angle’s former website and accused
her of toning down her rhetoric on the new website.” Reid sends a press
release: “Sharron Angle must really be scared that the extreme positions
she has held for her lengthy political career are already coming back to
haunt her.” (Goddard, 2010)
Sharron Angle’s strategy to portray herself as more extreme during the primary
campaign and then shift to appear more moderate during the general election cam-
paign is not without reason. Candidates understand that primary voters are more
engaged, informed, and interested than general election voters. Candidates who are
faced with a two-stage electoral process (a primary election and then a general elec-
tion) must campaign within, and appeal to, very diﬀerent electorates. Ambitious
candidates take this into account when formulating campaign strategies, and attempt
to shift their ideological platform to appear more palatable to the relevant electorate.
Although the idea of candidate shifting is reasonable and intuitive, there is a
dearth of research empirically studying this phenomenon. The trouble lies in recov-
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ering multiple measures of candidate ideology during a single election cycle. Most
studies that include measures of candidate ideology assume that candidates have a
single ideology throughout the primary and general campaigns. On the other hand, I
assume that candidates can and should adapt their positions based on the electorate
in which they are campaigning. Politicians are certainly aware of this fact. That is
why Richard Nixon told Bob Dole if he wanted to win the Republican Presidential
nomination he should “run like hell to the right,” and once he was nominated he
should, “run like hell back to the center.”
Mayhew (1974) said that members of Congress are single-minded seekers of re-
election (page 5). He goes on to discuss the electoral and institutional implications
of this goal. The key point for my purposes is that candidates are most concerned
with winning the election. No matter what other goals a candidate may have (such
as power, prestige, or policy outcomes), they need to get elected before those other
goals can be pursued. The problem is that candidates are faced with two elections,
and two diﬀerent electorates.
The perfect candidate would look one way to the primary electorate and another
way to the general electorate. Brady, Han and Pope (2007) argued that when faced
with such a dilemma candidates choose to position themselves closer to their parties’
primary electorates (page 80). However, this view assumes candidates choose a single
position prior to the primary election, and maintain that position throughout the
general election campaign. However, according to Holbrook (1996) campaigns are
best seen as a process not a single event (page 46). Here I argue that candidate
positioning is also a process, and more specifically, that after the primary elections,
candidates should attempt to adjust their position so they are closer to the general
electorate’s median voter.
Sharron Angle’s strategy to first portray herself as staunch conservative to secure
the Republican nomination and then moderate her position to align herself closer
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to the general electorate, is precisely the kind of behavior we should expect when
candidates are faced with two diﬀerent elections and two diﬀerent electorates. To
test for the presence of this behavior, I estimated two measures of Senate candidate
ideology, one for the primary campaign and another for the general campaign. If
candidates were completely free to move wherever they wish, we should expect that
they would position themselves on their primary electorates’ median voter positions
during the primary campaign, and then shift to the position of the general electorate
median voter during the general election campaign. However, there are several factors
that restrict candidate ideological location.
Evidence of Shifting
Candidates have to win the primary election if they want to carry their party’s label
into the general campaign. Rational candidates realize this fact and place a great deal
of emphasis on their primary campaigns. This is confirmed by a quick look at the
correlation between candidate primary ideology and their relevant party’s primary
ideology—displayed in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Correlation Between Candidate & State Ideology
State State
Primary Ideology General Ideology
Candidate Primary Ideology .934 .233
Candidate General Ideology .909 .269
Note: This only includes Senate candidates who ran in both the Primary and General Elections.
Candidate primary ideology is correlated .934 with their state party’s primary
ideology. The table also reveals that there is a much stronger relationship between
candidate general ideology and state primary ideology than between candidate general
ideology and state general ideology. Since candidate ideological shifting between the
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primary and general election campaigns is restricted by their primary platform, party
identification, the need to maintain credibility, information quality, and uncertainty in
the electorate, it is not surprising that their primary ideology is more closely aligned
with the primary electorate than their general ideology is with the general electorate.
Nevertheless, this does not mean candidates neglect to shift their ideological positions
in response to the general electorate.
Figure 4.1 illustrates an example of candidate shifting in the 2002 Iowa Senate
election. The circle represents the candidate ideology during the primary campaign,
and the point of the arrow represents the candidate ideology during the general elec-
tion campaign. The incumbent Democrat Tom Harkin’s primary ideology was much
closer to the general median voter than was the Republican challenger Greg Ganske’s
primary ideology. Harkin’s initial position is right (the moderate side) of the Demo-
cratic median voter. On the other hand, Ganske’s initial position is to the right (the
extreme side) of the Republican median voter. Since both of the primary median
voters have about the same distance between them and the general median voter,
Ganske must shift a much greater distance following the primary election than does
Harkin. This is in fact what happened, but even with the larger shift, Ganske was
still not as close to the general median voter as was Harkin.
Figure 4.1: Example of Candidate Shifting: Iowa 2002
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Figure 4.2 illustrates another example of candidate shifting, this time in the
2008 Kentucky Senate election. Here, Republican Mitch McConnell is the incumbent
and Democrat Bruce Lunsford is the challenger. As in the previous example, the
candidate who is on the extreme side of his party’s median voter shifts a greater
distance that the candidate who is on the moderate side of his party’s median voter.
However, unlike the previous example, the candidates primary median voters do not
have the same distance between them and the general median voter. In this case,
the Republican median voter is much closer to the general median voter than is the
Democratic median voter. Even if Lunsford’s primary ideology was on the moderate
side of his party, he still had to shift a greater distance to make up the extra distance
between the Democratic median voter and the general median voter.
Figure 4.2: Example of Candidate Shifting: Kentucky 2008
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Figure 4.3 summarizes candidate shifting and demonstrates that candidates do
indeed shift towards the middle after the primary campaign. The y-axis represents the
number of candidates that shifted and the x-axis indicates how far they shifted. The x-
axis is scaled in standard deviations of each candidate’s primary ideology density. The
figure indicates that 58 candidates shifted between zero and one standard deviation of
their primary ideology—representing about 25 percent of all the candidates included
in the estimation (N=235). Overall, more than 62 percent of candidates shifted
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towards the middle following the primary election. Clearly Senate candidates shift
towards the middle after the primary election, but there is also a lot of variation in
the distances of their shifts.
Figure 4.3: Candidate Shifting Toward General Median Voter
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Some candidates moved large distances following the primary election, while other
candidates moved very little. What explains this behavioral diﬀerence? In a very
technical sense, candidates are completely free to shift from one end of the ideological
dimension to the other. However, if this were completely true in practice we would see
candidates position themselves on their primary electorates’ median voter positions
during the primary campaign, and then shift to the position of the general elec-
torate’s median voter during the general election campaign. However, theoretically
(and practically) they face a number of restrictions.
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Restrictions to Shifting
First, candidates need to win the primary before they can move on to the general
election campaign. This means that candidates need to initially locate themselves
somewhere in the ideological distribution of their party’s primary voters. The degree
of restriction that this places on candidates will be dependent on the ideological
distribution of the state. If the primary voters were spread out, a candidate will have
more freedom than she would if the voters were compact.
The level of competition that a candidate faces in the primary election can also
restrict her primary ideological placement. If a candidate is uncontested in the pri-
mary, then she will be quite free when choosing where to place herself. On the other
hand, if the candidate faces competition she may have to align herself more closely
with her party’s median voter to ensure the nomination.
Once candidates have initially placed themselves during the primary campaign,
they are restricted as to where they can place themselves in the general election
campaign. However, candidates should try to move towards the center after the
primary election. For several reasons (which I will discuss later) they may have
trouble accomplishing this; but, generally speaking, I would assume that there will
be some movement towards the center.
Candidates would not be expected to shift from one extreme to the other. Besides
the fact that this would not be a strategically sensible idea (since the candidates
would alienate a large portion of the electorate), the voters may have a hard time
swallowing such a dramatic change. A candidate who engages in such extreme shifts
could lose credibility with the electorate. Downs (1957) argued that parties will not
be able to dramatically shift their ideology overnight and will maintain fairly stable
ideologies (page 109). We should expect that candidate ideologies would also show
some stability.1
1One would also assume that candidates would show at least some honesty as to their actual
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Candidates are also limited by the quality of information they have about the
voters’ ideologies. Generally speaking, candidates cannot be precisely sure where the
median voter is located, nor can they be certain about the shape and form of the
ideological distributions of the electorates. That being said, candidates who have
better information about the electorates will be able to position themselves closer to
the median voter than candidates who have relatively poor information. On the other
hand, low information and uncertainty also provide candidates with opportunities to
shift their ideological positions.
Voters are uncertain as to the precise location of the candidates. Voters can
get quite a bit of information about a candidate from only a few cues, such as race,
sex, endorsements, and party identification (Downs, 1957; Popkin, 1991). However,
research has also found that the value of information regarding candidates can be
negatively aﬀected by voter-specific characteristics, such as a voter’s level of political
knowledge (Lau and Redlawsk, 2001), or by candidate-specific characteristics, such
as mixed cues (Rahn, 1993). Furthermore, many individuals who end up voting in
the general election pay little attention to the primary campaigns and would not
necessarily know where the candidates were located during the primary campaigns,
nor would they necessarily register a shift in a candidate’s ideological platform.
Hypotheses
The central question to answer for this chapter is whether or not candidates shift
their ideology between the primary and general elections. However, the two-stage
primary-general election framework with myopic voters in the general elections sug-
gests that there will be variation in the extent of shifting across candidates. The
distance between the primary and general elections’ median voters will aﬀect how far
candidates need to shift. Candidates who come from states with greater distances
ideological position—however, this point may be debatable.
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between their party’s median voter and the general electorate’s median voter will
need to shift farther than candidates whose primary median voter is much closer to
the general median voter.
H1: Greater distances between a primary median voter and a general median voter
will lead to greater shifts in candidate platforms.
Candidates whose primary ideology places them on the far or extreme side of
their party’s median voter will have to shift a greater distance than if their primary
platform had placed them on the near or moderate side of their party’s median voter.
H2: Candidates whose ideological locations in the primary are farther away from the
general median voter will shift greater distances than candidates whose primary plat-
forms are closer to the general median voter.
A candidate’s initial ideological placement can be aﬀected by competition during
the primary campaign. Candidates who run unopposed in the primary election will
be able to select a primary ideology that places them closer to the general median
voter than candidates who have to fight for their party’s nomination. Subsequently,
the candidates who run unopposed will be closer to the general median voter during
the primary campaign, and will not have to shift as much as candidates who face
competition during the primary.
H3: Candidates who have greater primary competition will need to have a primary
platform that is closer to the primary median voter than candidates who have less
primary competition and will subsequently shift a greater distance after the primary
election.
A candidate’s experience will also aﬀect the distance he or she can shift. Experi-
enced candidates will have a better understanding of what voters are seeking. In other
words, experienced candidates will have better information regarding the ideological
distribution of the electorates. Experienced candidates should also be more adept
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at communicating their ideological platforms to the voters. Generally speaking, ex-
perienced candidates will behave more strategically than non-experienced candidates
(Jacobson, 2004). On the other hand, it could also be the case that experienced can-
didates are better known by the public. Candidates who have a reputation within
an electorate may find it more diﬃcult to shift their platform between the primary
and general election campaigns. That being said, the public’s dearth of political
knowledge sways me to side with them not having a clear idea of candidate ideology.
Thus, all other things being equal, better communication ability combined with a
better understanding of what voters want means that experienced candidates should
be able to present appropriate messages that lead to greater shifts.
H4: All other things being equal, experienced candidates will shift greater distances
than inexperienced candidates.
Results
Table 4.2 displays the results of a regression where candidate ideological shifting
between the primary and general campaign is the dependent variable. In the first
model, the independent variables include the distance between the state general ide-
ology and the relevant party primary ideology—labeled “Median Voter Diﬀerence.”
“Primary Ideology Distance” measures the distance between a candidate’s primary
ideology and his or her state’s general electorate median voter. “Primary Competi-
tion” is measured as the spending gap between candidates. Finally, “Incumbent” is
a dichotomous variable indicating whether the candidate is an incumbent or not.
Overall, the variables included in the first model explain a little more than 20
percent of the variation in candidate shifting. The variable “Median Voter Diﬀerence”
is significant, but is in the wrong direction. The coeﬃcient indicates that candidates
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Table 4.2: Candidate Ideological Shifting
Variable Coeﬃcient Robust S.E.
Median Voter Diﬀerence -0.349∗ 0.09
Primary Ideology Distance 0.515∗ 0.08
Primary Competition 0.043 0.16
Incumbent 0.215∗ 0.08
Constant -0.257∗ 0.17
Adjusted R2 0.205
Number of Observations 235
Significance Levels: ∗p ≤ .05, two-tailed test.
This only includes Senate candidates who ran in both the Primary and
General Elections.
Standard errors are clustered by election.
from states with large distances between their primary and general median voters shift
smaller distances after the primary than candidates from states where the primary
and general median voters are closer. On the other hand, the variable “Primary
Ideology Distance” shows that candidates whose primary ideology places them far
away from their state’s general median voter move greater distances than candidates
whose primary ideology places them closer to their state’s general median voter. A
deeper analysis revealed that candidates from state’s with greater distances between
their primary and general median voters had primary ideologies that were further
from their general median voter than candidates with shorter distances between their
state’s primary and general median voters. In fact, the Median Voter Diﬀerence and
the Primary Ideology Distance are correlated at .62.
Figure 4.4 illustrates the ideological movement of candidates between the primary
and general elections and helps explain the reason I chose to use Relative Primary
Ideology. Moderate candidates (candidates whose primary ideology is between the
primary and general median voters) behaved much diﬀerently than extreme candi-
dates (candidates whose primary ideology is on the far-side of their party’s median
voter). The 4 solid lines represent the average primary ideology for a Democrat and
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Republican who was on the near-side and far-side of their parties’ primary electorates.
The dotted lines represent the average general ideology of the candidates after they
shifted their ideological positions.
Figure 4.4: Candidate Movement
Democrats Republicans
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No Movement
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On average, candidates who were located between the primary and general me-
dian voters showed virtually no movement. However, on average, candidates that
were located on the far-side of their primary median voter moved about 1.5 stan-
dard deviations of their primary ideology towards the middle. Clearly, the amount
of ideological movement candidates portrayed after the primary election is related
to their ideological location during the primary campaign. Candidates undoubtedly
realize that they need to align themselves with the general electorate if they hope
to win the general election. Candidates whose primary ideology is too far from the
general median voter need to move a large distance to be viewed as an acceptable
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general election candidate. Figure 4.4 shows that, even after a large shift towards
the middle, candidates whose primary ideology placed them on the far-side of the
primary median, still found themselves further away from the general median voter,
than candidates who were moderate during the primary campaign.
Undoubtedly candidates do not obtain precise measures of the state’s general
ideology, their parties’ primary ideologies, and where they placed themselves during
the primary campaign. A more reasonable assumption is that, after the primary
election is over, candidates take a look at their primary position and try to move as
close to the general electorate as they can without alienating the voters who supported
them in the primary. The results of the primary election would give the candidates a
good indication as to where the actual location of the primary electorate was and who
their supporters were. If candidates find they were only supported by the extreme
elements of their party, they would realize they need to shift a large distance towards
the middle to have a real shot at winning the general election. On the other hand,
candidates who were supported by the median and moderate voters of their party
may believe they do not need to adjust their position very much at all.
To this end, I estimated the model again this time including the variable labeled
“Relative Primary Ideology.” This measures the distance that a candidate’s primary
ideology is from his or her party’s primary median voter, taking into account whether
or not the candidate is more extreme or more moderate than his or her primary
median voter (positive values indicate a candidate who is moderate relative to his or
her primary voters, and negative values indicate a candidate who is more extreme
than his or her primary voters). The results are displayed in table 4.3.
The negative coeﬃcient for Relative Primary Ideology is expected. It tells us
that candidates who find themselves on the extreme side of their party’s primary
median voter will move greater distances than if they were on the moderate side of
their party’s median voter. Moreover, the coeﬃcient for Median Voter Diﬀerence
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Table 4.3: Candidate Ideological Shifting
Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient
Variables (Robust S.E.) (Robust S.E.)
Median Voter Diﬀerence 0.143∗ 0.126#
(0.07) (0.07)
Relative Primary Ideology -0.537∗ -0.951∗
(0.06) (0.17)
Primary Competition 0.044 0.052
(0.16) (0.16)
Incumbent 0.233∗ 0.205∗
(0.07) (0.07)
M V Diﬀerence X Relative Prim Ideology 0.310∗
(0.12)
Constant -0.218 -0.191
(0.18) (0.17)
Adjusted R2 0.221 0.241
Number of Observations 235 235
Significance Levels: ∗p ≤ .05, two-tailed test; #p ≤ .05, one-tailed test.
This only includes Senate candidates who ran in both the Primary and General Elections
Standard errors are clustered by election.
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is positive, indicating that candidates who come from states with greater distances
between their primary and general median voters shift farther than if they come from
states with smaller distances.
Figure 4.5: Conditional eﬀect of Relative Primary Ideology
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The second model in table 4.3 includes an interaction term between Relative
Primary Ideology and Median Voter Diﬀerence. The conditional eﬀect of relative
primary ideology across all the values of median voter diﬀerence is illustrated in figure
4.5.2 The solid line is the eﬀect and the dashed lines represent the upper and lower
2The conditional eﬀect of relative primary ideology was calculated with the following equation:
∂Movement
∂RelID
= β1 +MVDiﬀβ3
The upper and lower confidence bounds were calculated using the standard error recommended by
Brambor, Clark and Golder (2006). The standard error is:
σ ∂Movement
∂RelID
=
￿
[var (β1)] + [MVDiff2 ∗ var (β3)] + [2 ∗MVDiff ∗ cov (β1β3)]
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95 percent confidence bounds. The eﬀect meets classic requirements of statistical
significance wherever all three lines are on same side of zero (which is referenced by
the horizontal line). The figure indicates that the conditional eﬀect of a candidate’s
relative primary ideology is significant across all values of median voter diﬀerence up
to 2.25 (that includes 95 percent of the cases in this study).
The eﬀect for relative primary ideology is largest when the diﬀerence in median
voters is smallest. But when the diﬀerence in median voters is large the eﬀect of
primary ideology approaches zero. To get a better idea of how this aﬀects candidate
movement I included figure 4.6.
Figure 4.6: The Eﬀect of Relative Primary Ideology and Median Voter Diﬀerence on
Candidate Movement
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Figure 4.6 includes three lines representing candidates with three diﬀerent relative
primary ideologies. The solid line represents an extreme candidate (relative primary
ideology is one standard deviation to the extreme side of his or her party’s median
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voter). The dashed line represents a median candidate (the median value of relative
primary ideology) whose ideology places them very close to their party’s median
voter. The dotted line represents a moderate candidate (relative primary ideology is
one standard deviation toward the general electorate).
The figure shows that when the diﬀerence between the median voters is small,
then the candidate’s relative primary ideology is an extremely important indication
of how far the candidate is expected to move. When the median voters are close,
extreme candidates are expected to move a large distance, but median and moderate
candidates are not expected to move at all. On the other hand, candidates who are
in contests where the median voters are far apart are all expected to move, regardless
of the relative primary ideology. Another way to think about this is that, extreme
candidates are always expected to move toward the middle following the primary
election. However, moderate candidates are only expected to move towards the middle
if there is a large diﬀerence between their party’s median voter, and the general
electorate’s median voter.
The variable measuring primary competition failed to reach statistical significance
in any of the models. I hypothesized that candidates with greater primary competition
would have to align more closely with their party’s median voter, and subsequently
would have to shift greater distances after the primary. However, there is no evidence
to support this hypothesis. However, a closer look revealed that non-incumbent
candidates are much more likely to face primary competition than are incumbents.
For example, from 2000 through 2008 only about 50 percent of Senate incumbents
had any primary competition. However, most of those Senators did not face strong
competition. Less than 10 percent of incumbents who had primary opposition received
60 percent or less of the primary vote. So among all Senate incumbents, only about 5
percent had any real primary competition. On the other hand, non-incumbents face a
lot more primary competition. During the same time period (2000-2008), 82 percent
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of Senate challengers faced some form of primary competition. Moreover, nearly 60
percent of those challengers received 60 percent or less of the primary vote. So among
all Senate challengers, about 49 percent faced strong primary competition. This is
much higher than the 5 percent of incumbents who faced strong primary competition.
The variable measuring incumbency had a positive eﬀect on candidate shifting.
I hypothesized that all other things being equal, experienced candidates would shift
greater distances than unexperienced candidates. This hypothesis is supported in all
of the models. Clearly incumbents shift greater distances than non-incumbents.
Summary My analysis revealed that candidates do indeed shift toward the middle
following the primary election. Candidates align themselves with the primary elec-
torate to win the primary election. Following the primary election, candidates shift
their ideology to appeal to the more moderate general electorate.
Candidates who came from polarized states had to shift farther than candidates
from less polarized states. Greater distance between primary and general median
voters lead to greater candidate shifts. Candidates whose primary ideology placed
them far from the general median voter had to shift farther than candidates whom
initially placed themselves closer to the general median voter. The models also re-
vealed that incumbents shifted farther than challengers. Experienced candidates have
better information about the voters, are more adept at communicating to the voters,
and behave more strategically than unexperienced candidates.
Primary voters are more involved, knowledgable, interested, and ideologically ex-
treme than general election voters. This leads candidates to take extreme ideological
positions during the primary campaigns. Candidate are then motivated to shift to a
more moderate ideology after the primary election to curry favor with the more mod-
erate general election voters. In this analysis I found that Senate candidates were
closely aligned with their primary electorates (correlated at .934) during the primary
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campaign. And although I found that candidates do indeed shift towards the middle
after the primary election, they do not completely converge to the general electorates
median voter.
Today, Congress is more polarized than it has been in many decades. Twenty-
five or thirty years ago, scholars were calling for more disciplined parties and clearer
choices between the parties. However, now the public is concerned that there is
not enough agreement among the parties, and that there is too much polarization.
The current state of congressional polarization could be the result of a higher degree
of discipline among the parties. However, it could also be a result of the extreme
ideological polarization between primary electorates.
The next step is to understand the electoral implications of candidate ideological
shifting. Do candidates who shift the largest distance fare the best in the general
election? Or is there a limit to the amount of shifting that the public can swallow?
Are candidates punished if they shift too far?
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Chapter 5
Candidate Vote Share
In the introductory chapter I said that the base theoretical model I use for this
analysis is a spatial vote model. Spatial vote models have a long history in political
science and can be traced as far back as Hotelling (1929). However, it was the work
of Downs (1957) and Black (1958) that marked the beginning of a surge in spatial
vote literature.1
Most spatial voting theories contain two sets of actors who are both rational
and self-interested, namely candidates and voters (Enelow and Hinich, 1984). Both
of the actors have some stake in the outcome of the election. The candidate gains
employment, power, prestige, and the ability to influence political policies (Mayhew,
1974). Voters will receive the benefit of favorable government policies, if their most
favored candidate wins the election (Fiorina, 1981). Spatial theories also predict that
voters will vote for the candidate whose ideology is “closest” to their own along some
relevant policy dimension. In the same way that candidates receive the most utility
from policy choices that are precisely aligned with their optimal preference, voters
receive the most utility by voting for a candidate whose ideology is most closely
aligned with their own. This is because these candidates are more likely to support
1Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000); Canes-Wrone, Brady and Cogan (2002); Hinich and Pollard
(1981); Rabinowitz (1978); Weisberg and Grofman (1981) are just a few.
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policies that are favorable to the voter. Moreover, a voter’s expected utility from
voting for any given candidate is negatively related to the distance between that
voter’s ideological position and the ideological position of the candidate. As we saw
in figure 2.3 on page 38 for candidates, a voter’s utility is also single peaked and
monotonically decreasing from their most preferred position (Black, 1958). This is
the idea of proximity voting and characterizes the classic Downsian spatial model
(Westholm, 1997).
It was not long before scholars began to question some of the fundamentals un-
derlying the classic Downsian spatial model. One of the earliest and perhaps most
important attacks challenged the validity of a single dimension of political conflict
(Stokes, 1963). Stokes (1963) argued that surveys routinely find independence among
individuals’ attitude dimensions. Since the Downsian model relies on a single dimen-
sion of political conflict, if voter attitudes are multidimensional this causes some
serious problems for spatial models. The presence of multiple dimensions make it
much more diﬃcult to find an equilibrium—a single position available to candidates
that beats all other positions. However, Stokes provided nothing in the way of ev-
idence to support his claim. Moreover, Plott (1967) showed that under the right
conditions an equilibrium in multiple policy dimensions is possible; however, McK-
elvey (1976, 1979) found that these conditions are extremely fragile.2 However, Poole
and Rosenthal (2007) found that more than 80 percent of legislators’ roll call votes
could fit into a single left-right ideological dimension. Moreover, adding a second di-
mension only improved the accuracy by 2-3 percent. Additional dimensions provided
no measurable improvement. Thus, I feel comfortable proceeding with the original
unidimensional framework outlined by Downs.3
2McKelvey (1976, 1979) found that voter preferences need to be arranged in a radial symmetric
way in order for an equilibrium to exist. However, Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000) showed that the
introduction of valence issues into a multidimensional setting is suﬃcient for equilibria to exist.
3Perhaps it should not be surprising that the vast majority of political conflicts in the United
States are compressed into a single dimension. When you consider how political issues evolve, if
enough people think that an issue is important, eventually the two major U.S. political parties
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Another challenge to the classic Downsian spatial model, led by Rabinowitz
(1978), argued that the direction of the candidate’s ideological position rather than
the proximity is important to a voter’s choice.4 The idea is that voters are not in-
formed enough to know if one candidate’s position is closer to their own than another
candidate, but they know what side of the issue the candidates fall on. In many cases,
the theories predict the same vote choice, but there are some occasions when they
lead to diﬀerent predictions.
Figure 5.1: Directional vs. Proximity
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Figure 5.1 illustrates an example of when the directional voting theory leads to
a diﬀerent prediction than the proximity voting theory. Under proximity voting,
the voters simply choose the candidate whose ideology is closest to their own. In
this case, Voter Y will choose Candidate A and Voter X will choose Candidate B.
However, directional voting theory predicts that Voter X will choose Candidate A
rather than Candidate B. Even though Voter X is 1 point closer to Candidate B than
to Candidate A, the voter is on the same “side” of the dimension as Candidate A and
this determines who the voter will choose.
Although the scholars who have promoted the directional theory argue that di-
rectional theory requires less knowledge from the voters, I am not so sure. Under
directional theory, voters need to know where one side of the issue is separated from
the other. Moreover, directional theory would predict that a voter would not choose
choose a stance on the issue.
4The research promoting directional voting over proximity voting included MacDonald, Rabi-
nowitz and Listhaug (1998); Rabinowitz (1978). Rabinowitz and MacDonald (1989) elicited a re-
sponse from Westholm (1997) defending proximity voting. Morris and Rabinowitz (1997) found
evidence for both proximity voting and directional voting.
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a candidate whose ideology is extremely close to their own, if they are separated by
this cutting line. The problem, as I see it, is illustrated in figure 5.2. According
to directional theory Voter X would choose Candidate A because they are on the
same side of the dimension. However, there is virtually no diﬀerence between Voter
X and Candidate B. I find it hard to agree with the prediction made by the direc-
tional theory, that, in this example, Voter X would choose Candidate A. Rather, the
prediction made by proximity theory—and the classic Downsian model—that Voter
X will choose Candidate B seems more plausible.
Figure 5.2: Directional vs. Proximity
      -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
Candidate A Candidate BVoter XVoter Y
Finally, in a critique of directional theory, Westholm (1997) found several inherent
problems. First, he argued that directional theory, because of its use of the largely
unspecified “region of acceptability,” is less falsifiable than proximity theory. Second,
he argued that directional theory had been incorrectly tested by relating sets of
alternatives across individuals rather than within individuals. Once the directional
theory was properly tested, Westholm found that the classic Downsian proximity
theory was superior. Thus, in this analysis, I assume voters base their vote choice on
proximity and not direction.
The aggregate eﬀect of the classic Downsian proximity model translates into the
Median Voter Theorem (Downs, 1957). The Median Voter Theorem predicts that,
in a two-candidate election, a candidate will receive the greatest number of votes by
aligning himself or herself with the electorate’s median voter.5 This does not mean
5Although empirical results show that candidates do indeed deviate from the median voter and
that many other factors aﬀect the outcome of elections, the mathematical and theoretical robustness
of the median voter result is unquestionable. In a two-candidate contest, under an enormous variety
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that candidates must align precisely with the median voter to win the election, but it
does mean that candidates must align closer to the median voter than their opponent,
if they want to win the election.
The median voter theorem, coupled with the large diﬀerences between the distri-
butions of primary and general electorates, means that the best candidate will look
one way—ideologically speaking—for the primary electorate and will look another
way for the general electorate. In the last chapter, I found that candidates respond
to this by aligning themselves with their party’s primary electorate during the pri-
mary campaign, and then shift towards the middle to gain more votes during the
general election. In this chapter, I will test a number of questions related to the eﬀect
of candidate location choices and movement on candidate vote share.
Theory & Hypotheses
The central question to answer in this chapter is relatively simple: is candidate vote
share aﬀected by candidate ideological distance from the electorate? This is the
foundation of my argument. If candidate vote share is not related to his or her
ideological distance to the median voter, then there is no incentive for the candidate
to align with the median voter. Thus, there would be no reason to believe that
candidates shift their ideology between the primary and general election. However,
in the previous chapter, I have already found that candidates do shift their ideology
following the primary election.
Candidates have a good reason to shift their ideology following the primary elec-
tion. Candidate vote share should decrease as their ideological distance to the median
voter increases. This means that candidates who find themselves far from the median
voter will have a much harder time winning the election than candidates who are
much closer.
of electorate distributions, the candidate who is closest to the median voter, is closest to a majority
of the electorate.
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Although most studies have focused on general elections, the eﬀect of ideological
proximity on vote share should be present in both primary and general elections.
However, there may also be some important diﬀerences between primary and general
elections.
One diﬀerence between primary and general elections is that in primary elections
incumbents should be given some ideological breathing room. Since incumbents have
already shown that they are viable candidates who can win in general elections,
primary voters should be more willing to vote for incumbents who are ideologically
farther away, than for untested challengers. This expectation implies an interactive
eﬀect between a candidate’s ideological distance and the candidate’s incumbency
status. It means that, during primary elections, incumbents will not lose as many
votes as non-incumbents, even if they are the same distance from the median voter.
H1: A candidate’s vote share is negatively related to his or her distance from the me-
dian voter.
H1(incumbents): The negative relationship between ideological proximity and vote
share should be smaller for incumbents in primary elections.
Another important question I intend to answer is if candidates get punished by
the general electorate for their primary campaign ideology positions. The idea here is
if a candidate portrays him or herself as very conservative or very liberal during the
primary campaign, the candidate will receive fewer votes in the general election than if
the candidate’s primary ideology was closer to the general median voter, regardless of
how far the candidate shifts his or her general campaign ideology. Even if an extreme
candidate tries to moderate his or her position to appeal to the general electorate,
the public may not buy the change.
However, unless the general electorate is aware that the candidate took an ex-
treme position during the primary campaign, there is no reason to believe that the
candidate will be punished. Someone or something needs to bring this to the atten-
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tion of the general electorate. As we saw with the Sharron Angle example, Harry
Reid’s campaign relaunched her primary campaign website, and exposed her previ-
ous extreme views. It seems reasonable to assume that the most likely someone or
something to bring a candidate’s extreme position to the electorate would be the
candidate’s opponent. I will discuss the operationalization of this with the other vari-
ables in the specific models; however, it should include a measure of spending that
occurred in the general election. If a candidate’s opponent is spending a lot of money
on the campaign, it is more likely that ads will appear attacking the candidate’s vot-
ing record and/or stance on various issues. It is easy to imagine an ad with a not
so alluring picture of a candidate, and a solemn voice saying, “candidate X said he
supported stance Y, but now he says he’s against it...come on candidate X, make up
your mind.”
Another way that candidate primary ideology can aﬀect general election vote
share is by aﬀecting the relationship between a candidate’s general election ideological
proximity and vote share. In the first hypothesis, I argued that ideological distance
is negatively related to vote share—candidates who are farther away receive fewer
votes. However, if a candidate was extreme during the primary campaign, then he
or she may get punished more severely in the general election for his or her distance
from the median voter, than he or she would have if his or her primary ideology had
been more moderate.
H2: All other things being equal, a candidate will receive a smaller general election
vote share if his or her primary ideology is farther from the general electorate’s me-
dian voter, than if the candidate’s primary ideology is closer to the general median
voter.
Other Variables For a variety of reasons, incumbents have a large electoral ad-
vantage in both chambers of Congress (Jacobson, 2004). These reasons include name
recognition, constituency service, campaign experience, etc. Although the advantage
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is especially strong in the House, incumbent Senators also enjoy an electoral edge over
non-incumbents. Hence, incumbents should receive more votes than non-incumbents.
A multitude of studies have found that campaign spending is positively related to
turnout (Brady, Han and Pope, 2007; Clouse, 2011; Cox and Munger, 1989; Holbrook
and McClurg, 2005; Jackson, 1993, 2002; Patterson and Caldeira, 1983). Candidates,
especially challengers, need to spend money to win elections (Jacobson, 2004). I
expect that campaign spending will be important during both primary and general
elections.
Competition also aﬀects a candidate’s vote share (Clouse, 2011; Cox and Munger,
1989; Patterson and Caldeira, 1983). Candidates who are faced with competition will
have a harder time getting votes, and will need to campaign more eﬀectively. The
relationship between competition and vote share should be present in both primary
and general elections.
Testing the Hypotheses
Equation 5.1 describes the expected relationship more precisely. The vote share
candidate-i receives is based on the absolute diﬀerence between the candidate’s ide-
ology (Ii) and the electorate’s ideology (Is). The model also includes a vector of
candidate specific characteristics (Xi) and district characteristics (Zs). The variables
included in Xi and Zs are diﬀerent depending on the election type (i.e. primary
vs. general). I will discuss the various candidate and district characteristics in their
respective sections.
Vote Sharei = |Ii − Is |β + α+Xiβn + Zsβn (5.1)
Before preceding to the analysis, I need to say a few words about the state
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ideologies. When I estimated the state ideologies in Chapter 3, I used a multilevel
model that incorporated population data and survey data. The National Annenberg
Election Survey data served as the base of the state ideology measures. Since the
NAES used a 5-point ideology scale, the state ideologies were estimated on that same
5-point scale. However, the candidate ideology estimates were not recovered on this
5-point scale. Thus, some transformation of the state ideologies and/or the candidate
ideologies must occur before any comparisons can be made.
If we assume that both measures of ideology are continuous and have the same
shape (but with diﬀerent means and variances), then the scaling function can be
decomposed into a combination of a linear function and a nonlinear component (von
Davier, Holland and Thayer, 2004; von Davier, 2007). This means that we can use
linear regression with a constant term to transform one of the ideology measures to
the other’s scale. I chose to transform the state ideologies to fit on the candidate
ideology scale.
Equation 5.2 displays the model I used to transform the state ideologies. The
scaled-state ideologies were obtained by regressing state ideology on candidate ide-
ology. Values for scaled-state ideology were then imputed based on the predicted
estimates of equation 5.2. I scaled each state’s primary ideology and general ideology
separately, year by year.
Scaled State Ideologyit = αt + State Ideologyitβt (5.2)
Table 5.1 displays the linear and non-linear components for each year and for
each election cycle. To estimate a particular state’s general ideology I would start
with that state’s general ideology, multiple it by βt, and then add αt. When the
table is viewed overall, a pattern between the linear component (βt) and the non-
linear component (αt) emerges. In years when the linear term is relatively large, the
111
non-linear component is relatively small. In 2000, βt, for the primary ideologies is
nearly the same as βt for the general ideologies (2.85 and 2.84 respectively). Moreover
the αt terms are also very similar (-9.36 for primary ideology and -9.03 for general
ideology). However, in the following year both primary terms are diﬀerent than the
general election counterpart. In 2002, the βt term for primary ideology is 3.49, but for
general ideology βt is only 1.25. So when calculating primary ideology in 2002, you
have to multiple the state’s NAES ideology by nearly 3 times as much as you would
when calculating 2002 general ideology. However, when adding the αt in the 2002
primary, you have to subtract nearly 3 times as much as you would when adding the
general ideology αt (-11.73 for the primary, and -4.25 for the general). Thus, although
there is a lot of variation between most year’s primary and general functions, the end
results of the functions are similar.
Table 5.1: Scaled-State Ideology
Primary General
Year βt αt βt αt
2000 2.85 -9.36 2.84 -9.03
2002 3.49 -11.73 1.25 -4.25
2004 3.05 -10.15 0.95 -3.24
2006 3.11 -10.19 4.85 -15.69
2008 3.96 -12.89 1.14 -3.57
“β” is the linear function and “α” is the non-linear component.
Before moving on I wanted to walk through one quick example. Let us scale
Wisconsin ideologies in 2004. We start with each parties’ primary ideologies. In
2004, the Democratic Primary ideology was 2.85, and Republican Primary ideology
was 3.64. To get the “Scaled” Democratic Primary ideology, we would multiple 2.85
by 3.05, and then add -10.15. This would equate to approximately -1.46. Wisconsin’s
2004 Republican Primary ideology would be [(3.64 ∗ 3.05) − 10.15] = 0.952. Wisconsin’s
2004 General Electorate ideology would be [(3.25 ∗ 0.95)− 3.24] = −0.153.
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Primary Elections
I begin with an analysis of primary elections. To get an initial sense of how a candi-
date’s ideological distance from the primary electorate aﬀects his or her vote share, I
correlated candidate distance from the primary median voter (specifically the abso-
lute value of candidate primary ideology minus the scaled Republican or Democratic
Primary Ideology) with candidate primary election vote share. The expectation of
the first hypothesis is that candidates who are farther away from their party’s median
voter will receive a smaller proportion of the total primary votes than candidates who
are closer to their party’s median voter. This initial look supports the first hypothesis.
Figure 5.3 displays the correlation between candidate distance from the median
voter and candidate vote share. The figure clearly shows a negative relationship be-
tween candidate distance and vote share. Candidates who have a substantial distance
between themselves and their party’s median voter need to be concerned that their
distance could cost them the primary nomination. Figure 5.3 includes all candidates
who ran in the primary campaign and had a competitor. The figure shows that the
correlation is -0.46.
There is very little diﬀerence between the parties. The overall relationship be-
tween candidate distance and candidate vote share for Republicans -0.44, and for
Democrats it is -0.38. However, if we look only at candidates who actually had a pri-
mary competitor, the relationship among Republican candidates is -0.45, and -0.47
for Democratic candidates with competitors.
Aside from Ideological Proximity indicated in equation 5.1 on page 109, I also
include other candidate-specific variables that indicate whether or not the candidate
is an incumbent, and the level of the candidate’s spending during the primary cam-
paign. Here spending is measured as the candidate’s total proportion of all candidate
spending. The only state characteristic included in the primary election model is the
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Figure 5.3: Primary Election Vote Share
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level of competition. Here competition is measured as the spending gap between the
candidates. If one candidate spent 70 percent of all candidate spending and the other
candidate spent 30 percent of all candidate spending, then the spending gap for that
race, and both candidates, would be 0.4. If there were more than two candidates in
the race then I subtracted the total spending of candidates who were not the highest
spending candidate from the value of the candidate who spent the most. This means
that competition can take negative values in races where the highest spending candi-
date spent less than 50 percent of the total spending. Table 5.2 displays the variable
explanations and expected direction.
I expect that the Ideological Proximity will have a negative eﬀect on a candidate’s
vote share. Specifically, the farther away a candidate is from the electorates median
voter the fewer votes that candidate will receive. I also expect that incumbents will
receive more votes than challengers. This should be especially true during primary
elections since incumbents are rarely subjected to strong competition. That being
said, any candidate who faces competition should receive fewer votes than if he or
she had no competition. And based on the measure of competition (lower values
indicate higher levels of competition) I expect that competition’s eﬀect on vote share
will be positive. The variable labeled spending is meant to measure the eﬀects of
money, and I expect that it will have a positive eﬀect on the percentage of votes that
a candidate receives in the primary election (Caldeira and Patterson, 1982; Cox and
Munger, 1989; Hill and Leighley, 1993; Jackson, 1997; Patterson and Caldeira, 1983).
Primary Election Results
The primary election results are displayed in table 5.3. The standard errors are
clustered by election. Overall the models do well, accounting for nearly 70 percent
of the variation in primary vote share. As expected, the first model shows that
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Table 5.2: Variable Measures and Expectations - Primary Elections
Expected
Variable Explanation Direction
Ideological Proximity Absolute value of Candidate Ideology –
minus Primary Electorate Ideology
Incumbent 1=Incumbent, 0=Non-incumbent +
Spending Candidate spending divided by the total +
spending of all the candidates
Competition Spending gap: Diﬀerence between candidate +
who spent the most and other candidates
candidates who are farther away from their parties median voter receive fewer votes
than candidates who are closer to the median voter. The coeﬃcient for the variable
labeled “Ideological Proximity” indicates that every one point of ideological distance
translates to approximately 5.1 percent of a candidate’s total vote share. Although
5.1 percent may not sound like a huge number (especially since primary elections
are typically not as close as general elections), keep in mind that approximately 14
percent of the primary elections in this study were decided by 5 percent or fewer votes.
So, a single ideological point could have tipped the scales in favor of the candidate
who lost.
During typical primary elections, Senate candidates receive anywhere from 75,000
votes to 300,000 votes. A candidate could increase his or her final vote share by
anywhere from 4,000 to more than 15,000 votes by locating a single point closer to
the median voter. Moreover, a single point farther away from the median voter could
diminish a candidate’s final vote share by the same margin. There is clear support
for the first hypothesis—candidates who are aligned closely with the median voter’s
ideology have a much better chance of being elected than candidates who are not
aligned closely with the median voter’s ideology.
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Table 5.3: Senate Primary Vote Share 2000-2008
Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient
Variable (Robust S.E.) (Robust S.E.)
Ideological Proximity -0.051# -0.082∗
(0.03) (0.04)
Incumbent 0.192∗ 0.156∗
(0.02) (0.03)
Spending 0.505∗ 0.495∗
(0.04) (0.04)
Competition 0.057 0.051
(0.07) (0.07)
ID Proximity X Incumbent 0.088#
(0.05)
Constant 0.190∗ 0.220∗
(0.07) (0.07)
Adjusted R2 0.678 0.680
Number of Observations 234 234
Significance Levels: ∗=p ≤ .05 two-tailed test; #=p ≤ .05 one-tailed test.
Standard errors are clustered by election.
This is also interesting because here I am looking at only primary elections. The
relationship between ideological proximity and vote share has been studied in general
elections, but very little research has focused on this relationship during primary cam-
paigns. Undoubtedly, this is because of the lack of data regarding candidate ideology
during primary campaigns. However, now there is empirical results to accompany the
theoretical results—in primary elections, ideological distance has a negative eﬀect on
candidate vote share.
To get a better idea of how this can aﬀect vote share and a candidate’s electoral
chances, I included figure 5.4. The figure illustrates the loss in vote share that can-
didates should expect based on their ideological distance from the primary median
voter. The vertical axis measures candidate vote share; the horizontal line at the
.5 value of vote share is there to reference the point where candidates go from win-
ning the election to losing it. The variable measuring candidate ideological proximity
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ranges from slightly higher than zero to 3.6 and is plotted along the horizontal axis.
It is clear that every bit of distance between the median voter’s ideology and the
candidate’s ideology costs the candidate votes.
Figure 5.4: Primary Election Vote Share: Incumbents and Non-incumbents
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The results shown in table 5.3 also indicate that incumbents do better than non-
incumbents. This result is also illustrated in figure 5.4. The solid line represents
incumbents, while the dashed line represents non-incumbents. Both candidate types
are expected to receive fewer votes if their ideological distance is great, but the neg-
ative eﬀect is much stronger for non-incumbents.
On average, and all other things being equal, an incumbent can expect to receive
about 19 percent more votes than a non-incumbent. This translates into anywhere
from 14,000 to nearly 60,000 more votes for incumbents. During primary elections,
Senate incumbents definitely have a marked advantage over non-incumbents.
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I also found support for the eﬀect of spending on vote share. The variable rep-
resents a candidate’s proportion of all the money spent by candidates during the
campaign. It ranges from zero to one. Thus, the coeﬃcient “0.505” means that a
candidate who raised 100 percent of the total election funds would get 50.5 percent
more votes than if the same candidate had raised zero percent of the total election
funds. Although the variable measuring competition was in the expected direction,
it did not meet classic requirements of statistical significance.
The second model in table 5.3 tests the eﬀect that incumbency has on ideological
proximity’s relationship with vote share. Here I am investigating how the distance
between the primary median voter and the candidate is aﬀected by incumbency.
Specifically, ideological proximity is interacted with the incumbent variable.
I hypothesized that the negative relationship between ideological proximity and
vote share would be smaller for incumbents than for non-incumbents. This is be-
cause incumbents have already proven that they are viable candidates who can win
a general election contest. So voters should be willing to provide them with more
ideological freedom than they would be willing to provide to a non-incumbent. The
results indicate that non-incumbents are punished more than incumbents for ideo-
logical distance from the median voter. The coeﬃcient for ideological proximity is
-0.082 and the coeﬃcient for the interaction term is 0.088. This means that the slope
for non-incumbents is -0.082 but for incumbents it is 0.006 (essentially zero). For
every one point of ideological distance between a candidate and the median voter, a
non-incumbent can expect to lose about 8.2 percent of the total vote share, whereas
an incumbent would not be expected to lose any votes. If we consider only non-
incumbent candidates, 26 percent of the races were decided by 8 percentage points or
less. That means that one-quarter of the non-incumbents candidates’ electoral for-
tunes could have been changed with a single ideological point. Figure 5.5 illustrates
the conditional eﬀect that incumbency has in primary elections.
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Figure 5.5: Conditional Eﬀect of Incumbency in Primary Elections
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The solid line in figure 5.5 represents the conditional eﬀect of incumbency across
all values of ideological proximity. The vertical axis measures the value of the eﬀect,
and the horizontal axis measures ideological proximity. The dashed lines represent the
upper and lower 95 percent confidence bounds. The eﬀect meets classical requirements
of statistical significance anywhere that all three lines are on the same side of the
zero position (which is referenced with the horizontal line).6 The conditional eﬀect
of incumbency meets these requirements of statistical significant across all values of
ideological proximity.
Figure 5.6 depicts the diﬀerence in vote share that can be expected based on
ideological proximity and incumbency. The figure clearly shows that incumbents
have more freedom, in regards to their ideological location, than do non-incumbents.
Both candidate types enjoy a healthy vote share while they are perfectly aligned with
their party’s median voter. However, if the same two candidates locate farther away
from the median voter, the advantage enjoyed by incumbents is quickly revealed.
There are several reasons that could help explain why incumbents are punished
less severely than non-incumbents when there is distance between them and the me-
dian voter. Voters may choose whom to vote for based on strategic considerations.
For example, voters could see incumbents as stronger candidates who have a bet-
ter chance of winning the general election than non-incumbents. If this were the
case, then voters may decide that a candidate who is a little further away from them
(ideologically speaking), but has a good chance of winning the general election, is a
6The conditional eﬀect of incumbency was calculated with the following equation:
∂Vote Share
∂Incumbency
= β1 + Proximityβ3
The upper and lower confidence bounds were calculated using the standard error recommended by
Brambor, Clark and Golder (2006). The standard error is:
σ ∂Vote Share
∂Incumbency
=
￿
[var (β1)] + [Proximity2 ∗ var (β3)] + [2 ∗ Proximity ∗ cov (β1β3)]
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Figure 5.6: Primary Election Vote Share: Incumbents and Non-incumbents
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better choice than a candidate who is closer but has a much lower chance of winning
the general election (Burden, 2005; Burden and Jones, 2006; Stone, Rapoport and
Abramowitz, 1992).
As plausible as this sounds, some scholars doubt that any sizable number of
voters actually engage in strategic voting. Abramowitz, McGlennon and Rapoport
(1981) argued that the notion of strategic voting assumes too much sophistication
on the part of the voters and is simply unrealistic. Cox (1997) showed that the
opportunity and conditions that support strategic voting are fragile. However, there
are still opportunities for strategic voting in U.S. elections. For example, third-party
supporters may be concerned that voting for their most preferred candidate will be
a wasted vote (Abramson et al., 1995; Burden and Jones, 2006). Burden and Jones
(2006) found that strategic voting among third-party supporters was as low as 16
percent among George Wallace (1968) supporters and as high as 81 percent among
Ralph Nader (2000) supporters. That being said, this only represented 2 percent
and 13 percent of the entire electorate, respectively. Moreover, 13 percent was twice
as large as any of the other estimates (Burden and Jones, 2006, page 5). During
Presidential elections with a third party candidate, about 5 percent of the electorate
engages in strategic voting.
If the vast majority of voters do not choose candidates based on strategic con-
siderations, then the fact that incumbents are much less likely to face a competitive
primary election than non-incumbents could explain why incumbents appear to be
punished less severely than non-incumbents. As discussed at the end of the pre-
vious chapter, from 2000 through 2008 only 50 percent of Senate incumbents had
any primary competition. One the other hand, 82 percent of non-incumbent Senate
candidates faced primary competition. If we set the threshold for strong competi-
tion at 60 percent or less of the total vote share, then 49 percent of non-incumbent
Senate candidates had strong competition, but only 5 percent of incumbents had
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strong competition. If a candidate is running alone in an election, then there is no
threat that another candidate will position him or herself closer to the median voter,
and the candidate will have much less incentive to consider the electorate’s ideology.
The aggregate eﬀect would be a weaker relationship between ideological distance
and candidate vote share. The fact that so many incumbents do not have to worry
about viable challengers could explain the comparatively mild slope for incumbents
displayed in figure 5.6.
Summary of Primary Elections Although very little research has studied the
eﬀect of ideological proximity in primary elections, there are reasons to believe that
candidate vote share is aﬀected by their distance from the median voter in primaries.
This analysis provides evidence to support that belief. Candidate vote share is nega-
tively related to ideological distance; however, not all candidates are aﬀected equally.
I found that non-incumbents pay a much greater price for diverging from the median
voter, than do incumbents. In fact, there is some evidence to suggest that—in primary
elections—incumbent vote share is not aﬀected at all by ideological proximity.
General Elections
In this section I move on to an analysis of general elections. To get a sense of how
a candidate’s ideological distance from the general median voter aﬀects his or her
vote share, I correlated candidate distance from the general median voter with the
candidates general election vote share. The results are displayed in figure 5.7.
There is a clear negative relationship between ideological distance and vote share.
The relationship between votes and ideological distance is stronger in general elections
than in primary elections (-0.46 in for primaries, and -0.56 for general elections).
Candidates who have a great distance between their ideology and the general median
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Figure 5.7: General Election Vote Share
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voter’s ideology must be concerned that their distance could cost them the election.
Many of the assumptions and expectations that characterized the analysis of pri-
mary elections are also relevant for general elections. Obviously the first hypothesis—
that a candidate’s vote share is negatively related to his or her distance from the
median voter—is expected for general elections. Candidates should obtain relatively
more votes if they are relatively closer to the general median voter.
I also expect that incumbency will positively aﬀect vote share. Incumbents should
do better than non-incumbents because of name recognition and other things associ-
ated with incumbency advantage. That being said, the eﬀect should not be as strong
in the Senate as it would in the House, since Senate incumbents typically face higher
quality candidates than do House incumbents. In the analysis of primary elections, I
found that candidate spending was positively related to vote share. I expect that, in
general elections, a candidate who spends a large proportion of the total campaign
spending will also have a larger vote share.
The second hypothesis only applies to general elections and was not incorporated
into the primary election analysis. Here I argue that candidates will get punished by
the general electorate for taking extreme positions during the primary campaign. I
operationalized this using a variable labeled “Initial Distance.” This is the distance
between the candidate primary ideology and the general median voter ideology. The
idea here is to see if candidates are punished in the general election for positioning
themselves too far from the general median voter during the primary election cam-
paign. Candidates who portrayed themselves as being extreme during the primary
campaign should have more trouble during the general election. Even if an extreme
candidate tries to moderate his or her position to appeal to the general electorate, the
public may not buy the change. This is precisely what happened to Sharron Angle
(see the discussion at the beginning of Chapter 4). Table 5.4 contains the variable
measures and their expected relationship with general election vote share.
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Table 5.4: Variable Measures and Expectations - General Elections
Expected
Variable Explanation Direction
Ideological Proximity Absolute value of Candidate Ideology −
minus General Electorate Ideology
Incumbent 1=Incumbent, 0=Non-incumbent +
Spending Candidate spending divided by the total +
spending of all the candidates
Initial Distance Absolute value of Candidate Primary −
Ideology minus General Electorate Ideology
Competition Spending gap: Diﬀerence between candidate +
who spent the most and other candidates
General Election Results
The general election results are displayed in table 5.5. The model in table 5.5 is
the standard additive model and accounts for 62 percent of the variance in general
election vote share. As was the case for primary elections, the general election results
indicate that the overall spatial model of vote share is correct.
Table 5.5: Senate General Election Vote Share 2000-2008
Variable Coeﬃcient Robust S.E.
Ideological Proximity -0.047∗ 0.01
Initial Distance -0.020∗ 0.01
Incumbent -0.016 0.02
Spending 0.216∗ 0.03
Competition 0.095∗ 0.02
Constant 0.441∗ 0.03
Adjusted R2 0.622
Number of Observations 235
Significance Levels: ∗=p ≤ .05 two-tailed test.
Standard errors are clustered by election.
All other things being equal, a candidate whose ideology is closer to the general
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electorate median voter receives more votes than a candidate whose ideology is a
greater distance from the median voter. The coeﬃcient for ideological proximity (-
0.047) indicates that every one point of distance between a candidate and the general
median voter translates into a 4.7 percent diﬀerence in vote share. The ideological
proximity variable ranges from slightly higher than zero to 3.5. Ideological positioning
and closing the gap between the candidate and the median voter could easily be the
diﬀerence between winning an election and losing an election. In fact, if you look at
the density in figure 5.8 you can see that nearly 1/3 of the elections in the sample are
close enough that a single ideological point could have changed the outcome of the
election.
Figure 5.8: Percent of Votes Received by General Election Candidates
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As I also found in the analysis of primary elections, candidates who spent a
relatively large amount of money during the general election received more votes
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than candidates who spent less money. The coeﬃcient for spending is 0.216. The
spending variable is measured as the candidate’s proportion of all candidate election
spending, and ranges from zero to one. Thus, a candidate who spent about 40 percent
of all candidate spending would be expected to receive about 2.2 percent fewer votes
than if that same candidate spent 50 percent of all candidate spending.
Unlike the analysis of primary elections, incumbency did not increase candidate
vote share, whereas competition did have the expected eﬀect on vote share. When
controlling for ideological proximity, initial distance, spending, and competition, in-
cumbents did not receive more votes than non-incumbents. On the other hand,
candidates who ran in competitive races received fewer votes than if the election had
been uncompetitive.
Testing For Punishment The second hypothesis is only relevant for general elec-
tions. Here I argued that candidates would be punished and receive fewer votes in
the general election if their primary ideology was too extreme. This is because they
would be seen as untruthful, or a flip-flopper. The results in table 5.5 reveal that
candidates are punished in the general election for extreme ideology during the pri-
mary campaign. The variable “Initial Distance” is the distance between candidate
primary ideology and the general median voter. The negative coeﬃcient supports the
expectation. A coeﬃcient of -0.020 means that every one point of distance between a
candidate’s primary ideology and the general median voter’s ideology translates into
a diﬀerence of two percent of the vote share—regardless of the candidate’s general
campaign ideology. Since, the “Initial Distance” variable ranges from 0.03 to 3.23,
and is normally distributed with a mean of 1.36 and a standard deviation of .71,
enough votes could easily be aﬀected to change the outcome of an election. Put sim-
ply: if a candidate is too extreme during the primary campaign he or she may lose
the general election.
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That being said, it is reasonable to assume that the general electorate would not
have knowledge of the candidate’s primary ideology without the candidate’s opponent
bringing it to their attention. To test for this, I interacted Initial Distance with
spending. Rather than introducing the opponent’s spending into the model and
interacting it with Initial Distance, I used the candidate’s spending. This is because
spending is measured as the candidate’s proportion of all candidate spending in a
race, and introducing opponent spending would be perfectly collinear to spending.
Thus, I expect that the interactive eﬀect will be positive. Specifically, the negative
aﬀect of Initial Distance will be mitigated if a candidate spends relatively more money
on the campaign. The first model in table 5.6 is a test of this hypothesis.
Table 5.6: Senate General Election Vote Share 2000-2008
Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient
Variable (Robust S.E.) (Robust S.E.)
Ideological Proximity -0.044∗ 0.000
(0.01) (0.02)
Initial Distance -0.038∗ 0.032
(0.02) (0.02)
Incumbent -0.014 -0.010
(0.02) (0.02)
Spending 0.168∗ 0.186∗
(0.05) (0.03)
Competition 0.106∗ 0.114∗
(0.02) (0.02)
Initial Distance X Spending 0.031
(0.03)
Proximity X Initial Distance -0.034∗
(0.01)
Constant 0.461∗ 0.382∗
(0.03) (0.03)
Adjusted R2 0.614 0.626
Number of Observations 235 235
Significance Levels: ∗=p ≤ .05 two-tailed test.
Standard errors are clustered by election.
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Nearly all of the variable eﬀects in the first model in table 5.6 are the same as
they were in the table 5.5. However, can the eﬀect of initial distance be mitigated
by candidate spending? The coeﬃcient for initial distance is -0.038 and statistically
significant. The coeﬃcient for the interaction between initial distance and spending
is 0.031 and is in the expected direction. Figure 5.9 illustrates the conditional eﬀect
of initial distance across all values of candidate spending.
To gage the eﬀect of Initial Distance we just need to impute diﬀerent values of
spending. The values for spending range from 0 to 1. The eﬀect of Initial Distance
for a candidate who did not spend any money on the campaign (i.e. spending = 0)
would be -.030. The average candidate spent about .5, or 50 percent of all spending,
the eﬀect of Initial Distance for this candidate would be -.024. For a candidate with
a spending value of 1 (100 percent of all spending by candidates) the eﬀect of Initial
Distance would be -.018.
Figure 5.9: Conditional Eﬀect of Initial Distance by Spending
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The solid line is the eﬀect and the dashed lines are the upper and lower 95
percent confidence bounds (the standard error used to create the confidence bounds
is described in Brambor, Clark and Golder (2006) and here in foot note 6). The eﬀect
meets classic tests of statistical significance anywhere that all three lines are on one
side of the zero value. The conditional eﬀect of initial distance is significant across
approximately 60 percent of the values of spending. This includes about 53 percent
of all the candidates in the study.
As expected a candidate’s vote share is negatively related to his or her initial
distance. However, the eﬀect is not as strong for candidates who spend a lot of
money during the general election campaign. That being said the diﬀerence across
the values of spending where the eﬀect is statistically significant is not very strong.
For example, take two candidates, the highest spending value where the eﬀect is
still significant (candidate spending=0.65) and a low spending candidate (candidate
spending=0.1), both of who were pretty extreme during their primary campaigns
(initial distance=3). The cost in vote share that the high spending candidate would
pay as a result of his or her primary ideology would be about 9.4 percent. However,
the low spending candidate’s vote share costs would be about 11.1 percent.
Although the negative eﬀect associated with a candidate’s initial distance is
slightly reduced if the candidate spends enough cash, a candidate’s initial distance
should also aﬀect the candidate’s ability to sell their new moderate message to the
public. No matter how closely aligned a candidate appears to be with the general
electorate, it will not be easy for the voters to swallow if the candidate was very ex-
treme during the primary campaign. More precisely, the negative eﬀect of ideological
proximity should be larger for candidates whose initial distance was relatively large,
than it is for candidates whose initial distance was relatively small. The second model
in table 5.6 tests for this interactive eﬀect.
The second model in table 5.6 includes an interaction term between ideological
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proximity and initial distance. The main eﬀect for initial distance is in the expected
direction, but does not reach classic requirements of statistical significance. On the
other hand, the main eﬀect for ideological proximity is zero. That being said the in-
teraction term between initial distance and ideological proximity is significant. More-
over, if we analyze the conditional eﬀect for ideological proximity across all the values
of initial distance, we would see that the eﬀect is strong (this eﬀect is displayed in
figure 5.10).
Figure 5.10: Conditional Eﬀect of Initial Distance by Spending
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The solid line is the conditional eﬀect of ideological proximity across all values
of initial distance, while the dashed lines represent the upper and lower 95 percent
confidence bounds. The conditional eﬀect of ideological proximity is significant for
values of initial distance that are approximately .75 and higher. This constitutes
about 80 percent of the total cases. Ideological proximity’s eﬀect on a candidate’s vote
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share ranges from approximately -0.025 for candidates whose initial distance is 3/4 of a
point away from the general electorate’s median voter, to -0.110 for candidates whose
initial distance is 3.2 points away from the general median voter. That means that
the negative eﬀect of ideological distance is more than 4 times stronger for candidates
with extreme primary ideologies, than it is for candidates with moderate primary
ideologies. To get a better idea how dramatically this can aﬀect a candidate’s electoral
fortunes, figure 5.11 depicts how candidate vote share responds to the interactive eﬀect
between ideological proximity and initial distance.
Figure 5.11: Interactive Eﬀect of Ideological Proximity and Initial Distance on Can-
didate Vote Share
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Candidate expected vote share is plotted along the vertical axis, and ideological
proximity is plotted along the horizontal axis. The solid line represents a candidate
whose primary ideology is extreme. The dashed line represents a candidate whose
primary ideology was much more moderate. The slope of the lines illustrate the
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loss in vote share that each candidate would be expected to endure based on their
ideological proximity. The red horizontal line references the 50 percent vote share
position—the point where candidates go from winning the election to losing. It is
clear from figure 5.11 that the negative eﬀect of ideological proximity on candidates
whose primary ideology was extreme is much stronger than moderate candidates.
The solid line representing extreme candidates (initial distance=3.2) quickly plunges
below the 50 percent vote share line. But the dashed line representing moderate
candidates (initial distance=0.75) is much flatter, and provides moderate candidates
with some wiggle room in regards to their general election ideological proximity. For
example, if we took a moderate candidate whose initial distance was 3/4 of a point
away from the general median voter and moved him or her across the entire range
of ideological proximity (0 to 3.6) we would see a diﬀerence in vote share of about 9
percent. That is to say that a moderate candidate is expected to received 2.5 percent
fewer votes for every additional point of ideological proximity. On the other hand, an
extreme candidate’s (initial distance=3.2) diﬀerence in vote share across the entire
range of ideological proximity would be more than 39 percent. That equates to 10.8
percent fewer votes for every additional point of ideological proximity. Candidates
whose primary ideology was far from the general median voter need to be extremely
sensitive to their ideological location during the general election campaign.
In figure 5.11, the extreme candidate’s vote share drops below the 50 percent
mark at an ideological proximity of 1.3, whereas the moderate candidate drops below
the 50 percent mark at an ideological proximity value of about 2.6. So the moderate
candidate has 1.3 more points of ideological wiggle room than does the extreme
candidate.
I want to discuss this specific section of candidates (those with an ideological
proximity between 1.3 and 2.6) further. The number of candidates whose general
election ideological proximity falls between these two points is a bit more than 40
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percent. So this represents a significantly large group of candidates. Of the candidates
whose ideological proximity was between 1.3 and 2.6 points away from the median
voter, 43 percent lost the general election and 57 percent won the general election.
The mean initial distance of those who ended up winning the election was 1.17, while
the mean initial distance value for those who ended up losing the election was 1.68.
The candidates who lost, on average, had a primary ideology that was more than half
a point farther away from the general median voter, than candidates who won.
We can also think about this from another direction, among candidates whose
ideological proximity is between 1.3 and 2.6, those candidates whose primary ideology
was extreme (initial distance greater than or equal to 2) only won 21 percent of the
time and lost 79 percent of the time in the general election. However, candidates with
the same ideological proximity (between 1.3 and 2.6), but whose primary ideology was
moderate (specifically, an initial distance of less than 2) won 67 percent of the time
and only lost 33 percent of the time in the general election.
Clearly, initial distance conditions the eﬀect that ideological proximity has on
vote share. Candidates whose primary ideology was fairly moderate (less than 2)
won 3 times as often as candidates whose primary ideology was extreme (greater
than and equal to 2).
Summary Overall the spatial model of vote choice is correct. Candidate vote share
is negatively aﬀected by ideological proximity. This is true in both primary and gen-
eral elections: candidates must take into account the location of the median voter if
they want to win. However, this negative eﬀect is not constant, it is conditioned by
other factors. During primary campaigns, I found that incumbency aﬀected ideolog-
ical proximity. Incumbents had a great deal of ideological freedom, and were able to
locate themselves anywhere they wanted without losing votes.
I also found that candidates are punished in the general election for the ideological
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positions they take during the primary campaign. Candidates whose primary ideology
was far from the general median voter received fewer votes in the general election,
than if their primary ideology had been closer to the general median voter. I also
found that a candidate’s initial distance has a strong negative eﬀect on the candidate’s
ideological proximity. If a candidate was extreme during the primary campaign and
wants to win the general election, he or she has little choice but to align very closely
with the general median voter—any distance between the candidate and the median
voter will cost the candidate a large amount of votes, and possibly the election.
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Chapter 6
Summary and Discussion
The idea of candidates shifting their ideology to align with the relevant electorate is
not new. Nixon told Bob Dole that he needed to run like hell to the right to secure
the Republican nomination, and then run like hell back to the center for the general
election. Recently Mitt Romney’s senior campaign advisor, Eric Fehrnstrom, was
asked if he thought that Romney was forced to adopt conservative positions because
of the Republican primary and if that would hurt his standing with moderates in the
general election. Fehrnstrom didn’t think it would hurt Romney. In fact, he claimed
that you can hit a reset button after the primary election. He said that a candidate’s
positions are like an “Etch a Sketch” (the once popular children’s toy), claiming that
after the primary campaign is finished, you can shake it up and start all over again. Of
course, saying this on a nationally-syndicated talk show was not a good idea and the
Romney campaign had to endure criticism; but that doesn’t mean that Fehrnstrom
was wrong. In fact, politicians and candidates often accuse opponents of changing, or
flip-flopping, their stance on one issue or another depending on public opinion. This
is meant to indicate that the candidate is either unreliable or dishonest. However, I
found that a majority of candidates do in fact engage in ideological shifting—and it
works.
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Does this mean that all candidates are dishonest? Not necessarily. Sharron Angle
never lied outright (as least not in this case). She simply stopped talking about issues
that painted her as a staunch conservative. Candidates do not have to completely
change their stances to shift their ideological position; they just need to focus on
issues that portray them diﬀerently. This does not mean that candidates have to
blatantly lie, but it does mean that they are aﬀected by the median voter position,
and adapt their ideology accordingly.
The fact that candidates do not have to lie outright to misrepresent their ideology
is probably not comforting to many people. It is not unreasonable to ask that policy
makers tell voters the types of policies they really want to enact. However, the two-
stage electoral process that is currently in place in the U.S. encourages candidates to
adapt their ideological position based on the median voter position. In doing so, it
encourages candidates to misrepresent their true ideological position.
Although we all know that candidates engage in this sort of behavior, the chal-
lenge has been measuring the behavior. One of the most important results of this
research was finding a strategy that solved this challenge. By utilizing the revealed
preferences of PACs through their donations I was able to obtain two ideology mea-
sures for each Senate candidate—one for the primary election campaign, and another
for the general election campaign. With these separate measures I was able to calcu-
late how much ideological shifting (or flip-flopping) occurs among Senate candidates.
As it turns out, Senate candidates do engage in quite a bit of ideological shifting
between the primary and general election campaigns. More than 62 percent of Senate
candidates shifted toward the middle following the primary election. More than 37
percent shifted more than one standard deviation of their primary ideology after the
primary election. Twenty-eight percent of all Senate candidates shifted at least two
standard deviations towards the middle. Moreover, I found that the variations in
candidate shifting are predictable.
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I found that the distance between the two relevant median voters is important.
In states that are highly polarized, candidates will have to shift greater distances than
in states with less polarization. This is true regardless of how far from the median
voter the candidate was positioned. That being said, candidates whose ideology
was extreme during the primary campaign always have to shift toward the middle
following the primary election. But candidates whose ideology was moderate only
had to move if there was a large distance between the median voters.
The eﬀect of candidate ideological positioning on candidate vote share was the
subject of the final chapter. Because I was able to recover two ideological positions
for each candidate (one during the primary campaign and another during the general
election campaign), I was able to test how ideological positioning aﬀects a candidate’s
electoral fortunes in both the primary and general elections. Overall, I found that
candidates need to be responsive to the relevant electorate. However, incumbents
have virtually unlimited freedom when it comes to ideological positioning during the
primary campaign. Whereas non-incumbents need to keep the position of the primary
median voter in mind if they want to win their party’s nomination.
Although incumbents are given total ideological freedom during the primary cam-
paign, I found no evidence to suggest that they are given this freedom during the gen-
eral election. What I did find is that candidates are punished in the general election
if their primary ideology was too extreme. A candidate’s primary ideology aﬀected
them in two ways. First, the distance between a candidate’s primary ideology and the
ideology of the general electorate’s median voter negatively aﬀected the candidate’s
vote share. Regardless of how closely a candidate aligns with the median voter dur-
ing the general election campaign, the candidate will lose votes if his or her primary
ideology was extreme.
A candidate’s primary ideology also aﬀects the way voters judge him or her in
regards to general election ideology. I found that candidates are punished much more
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severely for every point of distance between them and the median voter, if their
primary ideology was extreme, than they are punished if their primary ideology was
moderate. Candidates whose primary ideology was moderate have a lot of freedom
in regards to their general election ideology.
Future Research Future research should explore ideological shifting among House
candidates. Although there is less information about House candidates, if good mea-
sures of House District median voter positions could be recovered (including each
party’s district-level median voters), then it would be feasible. Aside from recovering
the median voter positions, another challenge is that House elections are much less
competitive than Senate elections. However, the relationships that I found in this
analysis should be present in House elections that have genuine competition.
That being said, ideological shifting should be explored among all elected oﬃces
that engage in an electoral process that includes both a primary election and a general
election. Candidates who face this two-stage election process should be attracted to
the median voter during the relevant stage. Any diﬀerences between these median
voters’ positions means that the candidates have some incentive to shift their ideolog-
ical positions between elections. If candidates do indeed engage ideological shifting,
we should be able to measure it between elections.
Future research should also focus on adding more years. It takes a great deal
of work to collect, rework, clean, and reshape the data before any models can be
estimated to recover candidate and PAC ideology. Not to mention that the models
themselves take anywhere from several days to a week or more to run. But even
taking all of that work into account, an eight year time period from 2000 through
2008 is simply not a wide enough slice to ensure that the relationships revealed here
have a consistent presence within the election process. So more years and election
cycles need to be analyzed.
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Aside from the work involved with recovering candidate and PAC ideology, the
data needed to estimate sub-state measures of a state’s democratic and republican
median voter positions, made it diﬃcult to include more years for the Senate. It would
extremely diﬃcult to do this for the House, because the number of responses for most
districts is simply too low. Moreover, the National Annenberg Election Study (which
is the data that I used to estimate sub-state measures of the electorate’s ideology)
was unable to administer a 2012 election survey. However, as new data sources arise
so may opportunities to collect these median voter positions.
Other ways to measure candidate ideological shifting should also be explored. Ad-
vancements in textual analysis could allow researchers to utilize candidate speeches,
tweets, etc. to test for the presence of shifting. There are a large number of ways
to do this, but clear diﬀerences in the types of issues the candidates focus on, or
even the candidates’ wording choices, could be indications of candidates attempting
to moderate their ideology following a primary that induced them to take a relatively
extreme primary ideological platform.
Future research should also continue to analyze the amount of punishment that
candidate primary ideology causes in the general election. The addition of more years
will allow researchers to see if candidates have always been punished in the general
election for an extreme primary ideology. Developing new ways to measure candidate
ideological shifting will test the robustness of the results uncovered here.
Analyzing ideological shifting in the House and in other elective oﬃces will pro-
vide an opportunity to test for the presence of candidate punishment within the
American electoral system. Do Gubernatorial candidates, Presidential candidates, or
any oﬃcial who is elected based on a two-stage primary/general election, face the
same punishment in the general election that Senators endure?
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Conclusion To my knowledge, no other research has attempted to recover multiple
measures of candidate ideology during a single election cycle. Furthermore, no other
research has tried to empirically investigate candidate ideological shifting, nor its
eﬀect on election outcomes. However, this is important to the health of our democracy.
Here I found evidence that candidates are encouraged to misrepresent their ideological
positions to the voters. In fact, the encouragement is inherent in the two-stage election
process that characterize most U.S. elections.
Although I did find an incentive for candidates to shift their ideological positions
between the primary and general election campaigns (and that candidates actually
do engage in ideological shifting), I also found that candidates are punished in the
general election for the positions that they take during the primary campaign. So
candidates may be shifting their ideological position between the primary and general
election campaigns, but the voters have some knowledge that this shifting is occurring.
Moreover, there is also evidence that they are holding the candidates accountable for
their primary ideological positions.
This was an initial look at candidate ideological shifting and its aﬀect on the
electoral process. This work is far from done. Scholars should continue to explore
candidate behavior within the two-stage election process. Then we can better under-
stand how widespread is candidate ideological shifting, and the implications of that
for our electoral system.
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Chapter 7
Appendix: Model Code
model {
for(i in 1 : Candidates){
for(j in 1 : PACs){
Y[i, j] ∼ dbern(prob[i, j])
logit(prob[i, j]) < − (−b[j] ∗ ((PACs[j]− Candidates[i])2)) + inprod(X[i, 1 : 5],beta[1 : 5]) + a[j]
}}
for(i in 1 : Liberal Candidate){
C[i] < − (−1.3)
}
for(i in 1 : Conservative Candidate){
C[i] < − (1.3)
}
for(i in 1 : I){
C[i] ∼ dnorm(0, 1)
}
for(j in 1 : Liberal PAC){
P[j] ∼ dnorm(0, 1)T(−1000, 0)
}
for(j in 1 : Conservative PAC){
P[j] ∼ dnorm(0, 1)T(0, 1000)
}
for(j in 1 : J){
P[j] ∼ dnorm(0, 1)
}
for(i in 1 : 5){
bx[i] ∼ dnorm(0, 1)
}}
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